DNA profiles disk inquiry
Introduction
At the request of the Attorney General, on 20 February 2008 I began an inquiry into the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) handling of a disk containing 2,159 Dutch DNA crime scene profiles that had been sent to the CPS by the Dutch authorities in January 2007.
My inquiry has now been completed. It comprised 3 key strands which are reflected in this report. These strands of inquiry have established:
- Firstly, the series of events beginning in May 2005 leading up to the provision to the CPS of the Dutch DNA disk in January 2007. This identified the nature of the arrangements made between the United Kingdom and the Dutch authorities for the exchange of DNA profiles for comparison with their respective national databases (referred to as Operation Thread) and how these arrangements were carried out.
- Secondly, the series of events and the actions of CPS personnel between receipt of the Dutch DNA disk in early 2007 and passing it on to the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in January 2008. This included consideration as to whether action of any kind should be taken against any CPS employee.
- Thirdly, the progress made since January 2008: to pursue the analysis of the Dutch DNA profiles; to exchange information arising from this with the Dutch authorities; and to identify, trace and prosecute those suspected of criminal offences both in the UK and in the Netherlands.
These issues are dealt with in detail below.
In summary, however, it is clear that the exchange of DNA data between the UK and Dutch authorities represents a highly promising and important example of international cooperation in the identification of those suspected of serious crimes both here and abroad. This exchange is likely to lead to the prosecution of criminals who would not otherwise be brought to justice, and the general approach can and should form the basis for further similar bilateral international exchanges in the future.
Nevertheless, the narrative of events does reveal some shortcomings in the way in which this process was planned and implemented, the most serious of which was the highly regrettable delay to the process while the Dutch DNA disk was in the possession of the CPS.
Operation Thread was the first of its kind. It was a ground-breaking initiative, in which problems arose largely as a result of unforeseen tensions between the informality of approach hoped for in the initial exchange process, and the more complex and lengthy formal arrangements actually required by the Dutch Ministry of Justice.
Although reference is made in this report to 'the Anglo-Dutch agreement', there is no single document that contains a comprehensive set of agreed procedures to be followed by identifiable parties throughout the mutual exchange process. This lack of a detailed written protocol appears to have contributed to the difficulties encountered, including the decision by the Dutch Ministry of Justice to unexpectedly send their disk containing Dutch crime scene profiles to the CPS rather than to the appropriate UK Central Authority.
In the absence of a single document of this kind, the account below provides an outline of the agreement for the mutual exchange of DNA profiles with the Dutch authorities, which has been pieced together from various sources.
In compiling the narrative it has become clear that there are some valuable lessons to be learned from these events. Consequently, this report identifies the actions already taken by the CPS to address internal performance issues, as well as a number of recommendations which should ensure that this bilateral process can be successfully pursued in the future to assist the effective international exchange of DNA data.
Events between May 2005 and January 2007
Background: The Convention of Prum
In May 2005, seven Member States of the European Union (including The Netherlands but not including the UK) signed the Prum Convention designed to increase 'cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal immigration'.
The emphasis in the Convention was on the mutual exchange of information including DNA data. Article 2 provided for the establishment of national DNA analysis files to which other Signatories of the Convention were to be allowed access. In Articles 3-7, arrangements were set out for a two stage process of DNA profile matching between Signatories.
In the first stage of this process the sending/requesting Member State submits 'DNA profiles of their untraceables' or crime scene stains that have not been linked to any individual to the receiving Member State. The receiving State then searches its DNA database, and in the event of a match (or hit) supplies to the sending/requesting Member State the reference data to which that match relates.
The second stage involves the supply of any further personal information connected with the reference data (such as the identity of any individual whose DNA profile has been matched with the crime scene profile). However, this is then governed by the national law (including the Mutual Legal Assistance rules) of the receiving Member State, in order to ensure that the personal identifying information about individual suspects may be used as evidence in the sending/requesting State's criminal justice system.
The Prum Convention, therefore, provided a good model for the international bilateral exchange of DNA data, creating a balance between the need for a quick and effective investigative tool and the requirement subsequently to follow more formal legal processes.
Although there were other aspects of the Convention that prevented our accession at that time, the UK recognised the importance of the exchange and cross-checking of information relating to individuals who may be known in another jurisdiction, to the investigation and prosecution of serious crime.
Early liaison between the UK and Netherlands
In view of this, ACPO and the Home Office had for some time been interested in exploring other available means of providing investigators in one country with DNA information held in another.
In 2005 a number of initiatives were being pursued, largely focusing on developing the exchange of DNA and other forensic data through Interpol, and these often involved the ACPO-Chaired DNA Operations Group. This was a group of expert police, Home Office and Forensic Science Service (FSS) practitioners set up in 2003 to develop the tactical use of DNA and to advise the National DNA Database (NDNADB) Board on policy and procedure.
As part of this work, on 18 and 19 May 2005 an Information Sharing Workshop was held in Hampshire to discuss cross border, police to police, use of DNA. The workshop was attended by police, DNA experts, a representative of the NDNADB Custodian, Interpol and Europol representatives, and the Home Office.
A further and much larger-scale seminar or conference entitled: "Maximising the opportunities for Sharing DNA Information across Europe" was then arranged by the Home Office, to bring together forensic scientists and law enforcement organisations from all over Europe.
This was due to be held in Warwickshire from 24 to 26 October 2005, and in advance of that conference, a visit was made by UK police officers to The Netherlands, which also possessed one of the largest DNA databases within the European Union. During that visit initial discussions were held with Dutch police and the Dutch DNA Database Custodian about a possible exchange of crime scene profiles, to facilitate a mutual search of each country's DNA database.
The Anglo-Dutch agreement (Operation Thread)
In October 2005 at the Warwickshire conference, representatives of the Dutch police approached UK police representatives with a view to formally establishing an exchange agreement for DNA profile information between the two countries. This was to become known as 'Operation Thread'.
There followed a series of meetings at which the details of Operation Thread were considered. Representatives of the Dutch authorities and the DNA Operations Group Board met on 15 December 2005, when discussions were held about the possible legal basis on which any exchange of DNA profiles could take place. This did not involve the CPS.
At that meeting, it was pointed out that Dutch DNA profiles were classed as judicial information and owned by the Minister of Justice. It was for this reason that the Netherlands was unable to make use of arrangements being set up through Interpol for the international exchange of DNA information, as Interpol is a police organisation. In addition, authority to access the Dutch DNA database had to be granted by an investigating magistrate (although the final decision to authorise access rested with the Dutch Public Prosecutor). It was acknowledged at that stage that potential legal complications in the Netherlands might cause difficulty or delay in the provision of Dutch profiles to the UK.
In contrast, from the UK perspective, it was said that there were no technical or legal difficulties in the exchange of data and this was confirmed by the NDNADB Custodian.
Agreement was reached for the exchange of disks containing up to 3,000 crime scene profiles, with the UK authorities providing its disk first.
In a series of briefing notes (undated) produced by the ACPO Chair of the DNA Operations Group at some point between October 2005 and the beginning of February 2006, it was made clear that Operation Thread was to produce a one off mutual exchange of unsolved crime scene stains (for serious crimes) and that the procedure envisaged would mirror the two stage approach set out in the Convention of Prum.
The first stage, involving the comparison of DNA crime scene profiles against the respective databases of each country, would merely indicate that the DNA search had identified the existence of matches. The second stage would then require more formal Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) arrangements in order for the receiving country to disclose the identifying personal details of the matches found, so that data arising could be used both for investigative and evidential purposes.
Those briefing notes also describe further details of the process to be followed, establishing that the delivery of the UK profiles disk to the Dutch was intended to be completed by the end of January 2006. However, some delay was anticipated in the provision and receipt of Dutch crime scene stains for comparison with UK DNA database profiles as this was dependent on the Dutch authorities ratifying the reciprocal exchange.
Discussions continued into late January 2006, when it became clear that it would not be possible to proceed on the relatively informal basis previously intended by both the UK and Dutch police. It became apparent that even for the first stage of the analysis of UK profiles to be undertaken in The Netherlands, the Dutch Ministry of Justice required a letter of support from the CPS. Until this point, although a CPS representative sat on the DNA Operations Group Board, there is no evidence that the CPS had been involved in any aspect of Operation Thread.
Email correspondence between the Home Office, ACPO and the Dutch authorities (and copied to the CPS) discussed the legal status of the exchange of DNA profiles and the authority under which this could be achieved. The CPS reached the view that the initial DNA profile exchange could take place in accordance with the principle of Reciprocity under International Law, and drafted a letter (dated 2 February 2006) to this effect.
Submission of UK crime scene profiles
At a meeting in The Hague on 3 February 2006 the legal basis of the exchange was agreed between the UK delegation (not including CPS representation) and the Dutch authorities, and a disk containing UK DNA crime scene profiles was handed over. An electronic spreadsheet was also provided to the Dutch itemising the offence to which each UK profile related.
The notes of the meeting show that in relation to the analysis of the UK profiles against the Dutch database it was agreed that:
- The letter drafted by the CPS confirming the legal status of the exchange would be submitted to the Dutch Minister of Justice in the week commencing 6 February 2006;
- Once official approval was provided by the Dutch Minister of Justice and the Public Prosecutor, the initial search of UK profiles against the Dutch DNA database would be completed;
- A data verification report would then be provided by the Dutch confirming the number and type of matches (or hits) identified;
- All results would be reported back from the Dutch authorities (by a designated Dutch Public Prosecutor) direct to the UK Central Authority (Mutual Legal Assistance);
- The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) would then ensure that all results were forwarded to the NDNADB Custodian;
- NCIS would also facilitate the obtaining and submission of MLA applications, and co-ordinate force activity to investigate the relevant offences/suspects identified.
The process was expected to be completed by the end of February 2006. However, efforts to progress the matter proved unsuccessful and the Dutch formalities were not concluded until the end of April. The analysis of the UK profiles was completed in May 2006, and on 7 June 2006 an e-mail was received by the CPS from the Dutch Ministry of Justice stating that the UK DNA profiles had generated some positive hits.
Despite previous agreement that all results would be reported by the Dutch authorities direct to the UK Central Authority (MLA), the email indicated that the formal report confirming the outcome was to be forwarded to the CPS. There is no obvious reason for this departure from the agreed approach.
The Dutch report was received in late June 2006 and was then sent by the CPS to the relevant police authorities. The report identified a number of matches, and in order to secure the further information concerning the identification of those matches, formal MLA was required. During much of July 2006 there was ongoing correspondence between ACPO, SOCA, the Home Office, other police experts, the Dutch authorities and the CPS on how this was to be worded. The CPS Policy Directorate drafted the MLA letters addressed to the Dutch Ministry of Justice and there was further correspondence between the CPS and West Midlands police concerning the case-specific content of at least one of these during August 2006.
The drafts of the MLA letters on file, contained a direction to the Dutch authorities to send the information requested directly to the West Midlands Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) dealing with the individual case investigation. The drafts also named a CPS contact for any Dutch queries.
Submission of the Dutch crime scene profiles
In relation to the anticipated submission of Dutch crime scene profiles for comparison with the UK DNA database, the last reference in any of the papers examined was made in an Interpol Briefing Paper (undated but produced between 3 February and 6 March 2006). In that document the ACPO Chair of the DNA Operations Group had given an update on Operation Thread, stating that the Dutch were then expected to compile their own disk in March 2006, subject again to the provision of Dutch Ministerial authority.
Despite this indication, there is no evidence on the face of the papers of any further discussion either between the UK and the Dutch, or between the police, Home Office and the CPS in relation to any submission of Dutch DNA profiles between March 2006 and January 2007. The next contact made with the CPS on this issue was when the Dutch Ministry of Justice forwarded their disk containing 2159 Dutch DNA crime scene profiles to CPS Headquarters at Ludgate Hill, London.
Agreed point of contact
At no stage had there been any agreement that the CPS should be the recipient of any of the information arising out of the mutual exchange of DNA data.
The only reference to an agreed point of contact for receipt of information sent to the UK by the Dutch authorities, was the UK Central Authority (MLA). However, this was only ever referred to in relation to the provision of the results of the Dutch analysis of UK profiles, and it is not known whether the Dutch Ministry of Justice had overlooked this agreement, had been unaware of it, or had chosen not to comply with it, in forwarding those results to the CPS instead.
With hindsight it could perhaps have been anticipated that the Dutch authorities might repeat this approach, perhaps given public prosecutors in mainland Europe's preference for dealing direct with other prosecutors. In any event there was a sufficient lack of clarity in the arrangements to allow the Dutch Ministry of Justice to mistakenly identify the CPS as the appropriate recipients of their DNA profiles.
Consequently, the Dutch disk was unexpectedly sent direct to the CPS, in January 2007.
Events between January 2007 and January 2008
There is no evidence that any process had been agreed for the transfer of the Dutch disk to the UK for comparison against the UK DNA database.
Method of transmission
The disk was sent to the CPS through ordinary business post in an envelope simply addressed to the CPS at its Ludgate Hill HQ in London. Neither the envelope nor the letter that accompanied the disk identified an individual or even a department in the CPS to whom the letter should have been referred. As far as can be determined no notice was given by the Dutch that the disk was on its way despite the fact that almost a year had elapsed since the transfer of Dutch crime scene profiles had been expected.
This method of transferring sensitive data was clearly insecure and contrasts markedly with the prudent arrangements made by the UK police to transfer the UK disk to the Dutch authorities in February 2006. The simplest and safest way to transfer the Dutch disk would have been for a Dutch police officer to personally deliver the disk directly to their UK counterparts or to the NDNADB Custodian, where it could have been held securely and actioned immediately.
In considering the arrangements made for the transfer of the Dutch disk two points need to be borne in mind. Firstly the informality and lack of detailed arrangements that characterised Operation Thread were not only the responsibility of the Dutch. Secondly the nature of the information contained on the Dutch disk may have led the Dutch to believe that a high level of security was not necessary.
The Dutch disk contained crime scene profiles which contain full or partial DNA data. This is of course personal and sensitive data, however the profiles are completely anonymous and do not identify the names, addresses or dates of birth of any individual. Only those with access to a sophisticated DNA database could identify the names of individuals whose DNA is profiled on the disk, and these databases are only available to law enforcement agencies.
Events at CPS HQ
However unsatisfactory the arrangements, the Dutch disk was sent to the CPS at its HQ in London, under cover of a letter dated 29 January 2007. Because the envelope and the letters within it did not identify a recipient there were problems in identifying the correct destination for the letter. CPS HQ hosts significant casework operations and HQ functions as well as a substantial part of CPS London. All deal with cases with international dimensions and it was assumed in the absence of a specific address or explanation in the covering letter, that the correspondence related to a specific case.
At first the correspondence was sent to Special Crime Division who deal amongst other things with extradition work. It was then forwarded to Organised Crime Division. Fortunately on 2 March 2007 a senior manager there contacted the Dutch author of the letter and on 9 March received the contact details of the CPS lawyer who had previously been involved with Operation Thread. Very shortly after that the correspondence and the disk was placed on the desk of that lawyer for action.
Although the difficulty in identifying the correct individual was a direct result of the lack of an adequate address, the delay caused at that point accounts for only a small part of the overall delay in dealing with the matter. Weaknesses in the systems for post receipt and allocation mean that it has not been possible to identify an audit trail, which clarifies the exact date of receipt of the correspondence at CPS HQ and its transfer between the divisions and directorates within HQ. Although the detailed requirements for post distribution do need to take into account the wider data handling and security arrangements that the nature of our operations requires it is nevertheless unsatisfactory that there are no procedures in place to deal with unidentified mail. Consequently a more detailed review of the arrangements that are necessary to safeguard the integrity and security of CPS information and correspondence has now been commissioned.
By March 2007 the Dutch disk was in the hands of the lawyer who, although not expecting the disk, was aware of the background to Operation Thread, knew what was likely to be contained on the disk and should have understood its importance to the investigation of crime in the Netherlands. All that was now required was for the disk to be placed in a safe or secure cabinet and for contact to be made quickly with the police to arrange for the secure collection or transfer of the disk. This was a simple task that could and should have been undertaken immediately.
In the event the disk was not handed over to the NDNADB Custodian until January 2008.The lack of urgency and security that had characterised the creation and transfer of the Dutch disk to the CPS also characterised it's handling when in the possession of the CPS. The history of the matter, however, provides no excuse for the laxity in the handling of the disk by the CPS personnel responsible.
As a result of my inquiry into these events disciplinary and other management action has been instigated. In these circumstances a full and detailed account of the handling (or more precisely the lack of handling) of the disk that took place while it was in the possession of the CPS has not been provided. However, in view of the understandable concern about the matter the brief summary below will provide some explanation of the events in question.
The lawyer, who had earlier assisted in Operation Thread, received the Dutch disk shortly before commencing a lengthy and unexpected period of absence in early April 2007. Arrangements were not made for the transfer of the disk to the police before that period of absence began. The immediate supervisor of that lawyer was not informed before the absence commenced that an urgent issue needed to be addressed and as a result the matter was not progressed. On 24 April 2007 the Dutch authorities did ask about the progress of the matter but this enquiry did not prompt action.
In August 2007 further queries were raised about the disk which did prompt an unsuccessful search for the disk, but did not result in any further action. Out of an understandable consideration for the individual due to the nature of their absence no contact was made with the lawyer concerned to ascertain the whereabouts of the disk. The Dutch were contacted on 14 August by the Home Office Forensic Science Policy Unit (FSPU) to see if they could provide another copy of the disk, but the Dutch Authorities were more concerned about the whereabouts of the original disk and the matter was not pursued. At any point during this prolonged period had the matter been reported to a senior manager in the Directorate urgent action could have been taken to rectify the position.
On 25/26 October 2007 the lawyer returned from their period of absence. The disk was retrieved and on 21 November the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) were contacted. In keeping with the unfortunate history of the matter, there followed an almost casual exchange of correspondence over the next two months, while officials from the Home Office (FSPU), the CPS and the NDNADB Custodian (NPIA) settled the arrangements for the secure transfer of the disk. The disk was eventually collected by the NDNADB Custodian on 11 January 2008.
Security of the disk
The inquiry has found nothing to suggest that the disk was copied or otherwise interfered with while it was in the possession of the CPS or that it ever left the security of the CPS HQ building. Nonetheless the disk was clearly not securely stored within the building while arrangements were made for its transfer.
Although in the light of my recommendations detailed later in this report it is highly unlikely that the CPS will receive similar data in the future, arrangements similar to those that exist for the handling of sensitive casework are now in place in the Directorate in question which provide for the safe and secure storage of sensitive information.
There will inevitably be questions as to whether the lax arrangements and casual attitudes described in this report are illustrative of the standards applied by the CPS to other areas of its work. This inquiry has identified individual failings that will now be pursued through disciplinary and other management action but the failures are not systemic and appear to be linked entirely to the unusual and unique circumstances surrounding Operation Thread.
Events since January 2008
Once the Dutch disk was passed to the NPIA matters proceeded quickly and efficiently. The NDNADB Custodian immediately began the task of batching and comparing the Dutch crime scene profiles against the UK DNA database. The police also formed a Gold Team to steer and direct operations, deal with requests for further co-operation from the Dutch and to deal with any public protection issues triggered by the intelligence about the links with unsolved crimes in the Netherlands. An experienced Superintendent was appointed as the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and a small operations team was put in place.
Update on DNA matches
A degree of discretion is still required on how much of the ensuing activity can safely be reported. A number of individuals who may have felt they had successfully escaped justice in the Netherlands are now at risk of arrest and it would be very unfortunate if a fuller reporting of Operation Thread alerted them to their vulnerability and caused them to go into hiding, flee the jurisdiction or impede investigations in the Netherlands. ACPO have confirmed they remain concerned about the issue and consequently the Home Secretary has made a commitment to Parliament to report back once all the information has been finalised after a full and thorough investigation by the police.
It can however be confirmed that from the 2159 Dutch crime scene profiles, a number of full and very good partial matches have been reported to the Dutch authorities. The police have also been able to provide valuable intelligence about other cases which may lead to requests for further co-operation from the Dutch.
This information was delivered to the Dutch authorities by hand on 12 March 2008 when the CPS Chief Operating Officer and police Gold Group Commander travelled to The Hague to meet with Dutch Forensic Science officials and prosecutors.
The parties discussed possible action to conduct further enhanced forensic analysis of partial matches, in order to either eliminate or improve their significance. The opportunity was also taken to discuss maximising cooperation on the provision of Mutual Legal Assistance and on possible future requests for European Arrest Warrants as a result of this exercise, although at this stage the Dutch authorities are unable to say whether the need for this will arise.
Liaison between the UK and Dutch authorities is continuing, and there is CPS representation on the Gold group dealing with ongoing investigations.
Addressing public concerns in the UK
Broad details concerning the Dutch DNA disk and the fact that a number of individuals had been identified on the UK database became public knowledge in February this year.
There has been concern about the risk posed for the future by these individuals while in the UK and the understandable wish that they be dealt with quickly for any crimes committed in the Netherlands. Part of this anxiety stems from a misunderstanding of the basis of the co-operation we are providing to the Dutch and indeed the significance of the DNA information available.
As has already been referred to, the Dutch disk contains DNA profiles from unsolved crime scenes in the Netherlands. Neither the UK authorities nor the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) who compiled the disk know the details (including the age) or relevance of the individual profiles. The profiles may relate to blood or semen stains found on a victim's clothing and may be highly relevant. Profiles may, however, have been obtained from less obvious sources, for example from cigarette stubs recovered in the search of an extensive crime scene inside a police cordon. Matches in these circumstances, while possibly providing very useful intelligence, may not provide compelling evidence to justify an arrest. Only the Dutch prosecutors and investigators involved in the individual cases will be able to assess the significance of the information provided by the UK police and as a consequence only they can determine whether to seek further co-operation from the UK or obtain warrants for the arrest of the individuals.
The Dutch disk has now been returned to the Netherlands. The profiles contained on the disk have not been added to the UK DNA database. Further action will now depend on requests for co-operation from the Netherlands.
To be clear, there is no basis for proceeding in the UK against any of the individuals in the absence of requests for arrest warrants from the Netherlands. As a result of Operation Thread, useful intelligence is now available to the police in the UK that these individuals may have committed serious crimes abroad but this does not of itself provide a reason to arrest these individuals unless and until the Dutch police seek our assistance. The details have also been passed by ACPO to police forces here so that they are aware of the public protection implications and can use the information accordingly.
The lack of certainty about the outcome of the exercise may be seen as unsatisfactory because we now know there may be a number of people at large who may have committed offences in the Netherlands and the decision and pace with which they are dealt is not in the hands of the UK authorities unless, of course, they come to notice for offences committed here. The reality of course is that these individuals have been at large in the UK potentially for many years; we simply were unaware of the fact. Because of the advances in DNA and the co-operation between the Dutch and the UK we now have the potential to tackle offenders who thought they had escaped justice in the Netherlands and in doing so remove those individuals from the UK.
Concluding comments and recommendations
This initiative, to use the hugely impressive resources of two powerful national DNA databases to identify and prosecute those who might otherwise escape justice, is testament to the importance of close international co-operation in the fight against serious crime.
Operation Thread was the first of its kind in the UK. The motivation behind it and principles that underpinned it were entirely sound. Given the ground breaking character of this initiative, the fact that with hindsight it is possible to identify some weaknesses in its implementation is perhaps unsurprising.
The most serious of these is the extremely regrettable failure of CPS personnel to deal appropriately and expeditiously with the disk of DNA profiles unexpectedly entrusted to the CPS. For this failure, and the delay to the process caused by it, the CPS apologises unreservedly. Action has already been instigated to address this failure, both in terms of staff disciplinary and other management action and internal procedural changes. These should prevent any similar occurrence in the future.
There are other more general lessons to be learned from this initiative, and these are addressed in the recommendations made below. Implementing these recommendations is, in my view, essential in order to provide effective arrangements for the international exchange of DNA data and evidence.
However, it is also important that the requirements we introduce do not deter other jurisdictions from seeking our assistance. Consequently, these recommendations are few in number and general in nature allowing flexibility of application in accordance with the particular circumstances of the bilateral exchange proposed.
Recommendations
My recommendations are:
- That any bilateral discussions for the exchange of DNA data between the UK and foreign jurisdictions should include representatives from the CPS as well as the equivalent prosecuting authority from that foreign jurisdiction. This involvement should begin during the earliest stages of discussions and continue throughout the lifetime of any resulting operation.
- That such discussions should result in the production of a written agreement or protocol, understood and endorsed by all parties, prior to implementation of any mutual exchange arrangements and that appropriate Ministers in the relevant jurisdictions should be made aware of the protocol.
- That every such agreement or protocol should:
- Outline each of the key steps to be taken:
- in the production and secure transmission of DNA data by the sending/requesting state to the receiving state;
- in the notification of the results of any initial database comparison to the sending/requesting state; and
- for the provision of Mutual Legal Assistance, and the securing of information and evidence derived from the DNA data.
- Attribute responsibility for each step to an identified party, and preferably to a named individual where possible.
- Identify a senior or key point of contact for each organisation or department involved in the initiative in both jurisdictions.
- Identify an anticipated timescale for the completion of each stage of the mutual exchange process, and establish a mechanism for the recorded agreement of any revisions to that timescale where necessary.
- Outline each of the key steps to be taken:
- That every such agreement or protocol should comply with the pre-existing legal and procedural requirements of the jurisdictions/states involved, including any data protection regimes.
- That plans for addressing any real or perceived public protection issues that may arise from the results of the DNA comparisons should be in place prior to implementation of any mutual exchange arrangements.
- That an agreed media handling plan should be in place, prior to implementation of any mutual exchange arrangements.
Concluding comments
It is essential that understandable concerns caused by both the delay in executing Operation Thread, and the uncertainty of its final outcome, do not in any way diminish enthusiasm for similar exchange agreements with other partner states in the future.
There is much good work to be built upon here. Successful bilateral international exchanges of DNA data supported by strong Mutual Legal Assistance arrangements may perhaps lead to a degree of short term uncertainty, but they will ultimately make us safer.
PETER LEWIS
Chief Executive
Crown Prosecution Service
14 May 2008
