CPS decision in Ladbroke Grove collision
06/12/2005
The Crown Prosecution Service announced today that there is insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction of any individual for any offences in relation to the fatal train crash at Ladbroke Grove, London, on 5 October 1999.
It is the intention of the CPS, however, to prosecute Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd (formerly Railtrack PLC) under Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
Chris Newell, CPS Principal Legal Adviser, said:
"I know this decision will come as a bitter disappointment to those left bereaved and seriously injured as a result of the Ladbroke Grove collision but the Crown Prosecution Service is bound to follow the tests set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and to apply the law in the way in which it is interpreted by the courts. I have extended an invitation to meet with those people who were directly affected by this tragedy in order to explain further the reasons for our decision."
In May 2002, following two previous decisions in this case, the CPS asked British Transport Police (BTP) to conduct specific further investigations into the circumstances leading to the fatal collision. These enquiries related to signal sighting issues and whether those contributed to the Ladbroke Grove collision.
The BTP investigation was comprehensive, extending over nearly three years. The CPS instructed leading and three junior Counsel and throughout, the CPS, Counsel and BTP officers consulted closely about developments.
In April this year, following receipt of Counsel's advice, the CPS believed that there was sufficient evidence to support a prosecution against individuals either for gross negligence manslaughter or for endangering the safety of passengers under Section 34 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861. We also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to mount a prosecution against Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd under Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. But there was no basis for a corporate manslaughter charge or a charge against Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd under Section 34 of the 1861 Act.
However, in the course of a final clarification of key issues, comments by expert witnesses together with the product of further police inquiries, revived the possibility of a speed restriction as a remedial measure, which would not have prevented the collision. This would make a jury's task more difficult in comprehending the factual argument on causation and to that extent, weakened the potential case.
The result of the Hatfield trial earlier this year further, and fatally, weakened the potential case. Mr Justice Mackay, the judge in the Hatfield case, ruled that although there was evidence that a jury could have found "an error of judgement, arguably a bad error of judgement" or that certain defendants "acted as no reasonably competent and careful [postholder] should in those circumstances have acted, . that level of want of care does not approach the necessary legal threshold for a manslaughter conviction".
Having studied the judge's ruling carefully, the CPS is satisfied that Mr Justice Mackay's approach would be followed by any judge trying a case of manslaughter arising out of the Ladbroke Grove crash. It demonstrated how difficult it is for the prosecution to establish gross negligence to the criminal standard of proof. Also, the acquittal of the individual defendants of charges under Section 7 of the 1974 Act in the Hatfield trial demonstrated the difficulty of establishing criminal liability in this type of case.
Following the Hatfield ruling Counsel provided further written advice to the CPS in September 2005, revising their earlier conclusions as to the prospects of conviction, acknowledging the effect of the trial judge's ruling in the Hatfield case and to the verdicts of the jury at the conclusion of the trial. The CPS accepts and agrees with Counsel's advice.
Notes to Editors
- Section 3 of the 1974 Health & Safety at Work Act provides that:
- Charges considered were:
- manslaughter;
- endangering the lives of passengers by wilful neglect under Section 34 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861;
- Section 7 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
- In the course of this investigation the following material was passed to the CPS:
- 23 submissions were provided by the police to the CPS;
- Statements with submissions total 2,236 pages;
- Exhibits within submissions total 29,599 pages;
- 978 witness statements.
- CPS has released three statements in this case. The first, on 9 May 2000, was a decision not to prosecute (Ref: 115/00). Following the Cullen Inquiry, on 24 October 2001 we advised BTP that a further investigation could not be justified (Ref: 132/01). On 22 May 2002 we advised BTP to conduct further limited enquiries (124/02). Previous press releases available on request.
- Following discussions between BTP, CPS and the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), it was agreed that HSE would proceed with its prosecution of Thames Trains Ltd for health and safety offences whilst BTP and the CPS would take forward all other aspects of the Ladbroke Grove investigation.
- All enquires to CPS press office on 020 7796 8102.
"(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health and safety." Failure to provide this duty is a criminal offence.
