Homicide - Murder

The law

Definition of murder (Archbold 19-1)

1. With three exceptions (see voluntary manslaughter later) the crime of murder is committed, where a person of sound mind and discretion (i.e. sane):
• Unlawfully kills (i.e. not self-defence or other justified killing)
• Any reasonable creature (human being)
• In being (born alive and breathing through its own lungs – Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority (1991) 1 All ER 801 and AG Ref No 3 of 1994 (1997) 3 All ER 936.
• Under the Queen's Peace
• With intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (GBH).
2. Death no longer needs to follow within a year and a day - Law Reform (Year & a Day Rule) Act, 1996 where the act or omission occurred after 7/6/1996. Note however that the Attorney General's consent must be obtained in such circumstances. Please refer to Consents to prosecute, elsewhere in this guidance.
3. A British subject can be indicted for murder in England and Wales even when he commits the offence outside the jurisdiction. The nationality of the victim is immaterial: Section 9 Offences against the Person Act 1861.
4. Murder cannot be committed by a company or other corporation.

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Intent (Archbold 19-19)

1. For the principal defendant, (see later for joint enterprise) the intent for murder is the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (GBH), nothing less. Foresight is no more than evidence from which the jury may draw the inference of intent – c.f. R v Woollin [1999] 1 Cr App R 8 (HOL).

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Voluntary manslaughter (Archbold 19-97)

1. The three exceptions mentioned above - i.e. the "special defences", do not entitle the defendant to a total acquittal, but reduce the charge against him from murder to manslaughter. This is despite all the elements of murder being present, including intent to kill or cause GBH. The "special defences" are:
• Diminished Responsibility
• Provocation
• Acting in pursuance of a suicide pact.

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Diminished responsibility (Archbold 19-66)

1. Section 2(1) Homicide Act 1957: "Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if:
• he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
• whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury
• as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killings"

See R v. Byrne (1960) 44 Cr App R 246.

2. Impairment must be substantial, there must be evidence of this and it must be raised by defence c.f. R v Campbell [1987] 84 Cr App R 255, R v Kooken [1982] 74 Cr App R 30.
3. It is for the defence to prove that the person is, by virtue of this section, not liable to be convicted of murder. The evidential burden is on the defence on the balance of probabilities i.e. the civil standard (in contrast to provocation – see below).
4. Abnormality of mind means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable person would term it abnormal. It covers the ability to exercise willpower or to control physical acts in accordance with rational judgement. It is a question for a jury. They are not bound to accept medical evidence: R v Sanders [1991] Crim LR 781.
5. If diminished responsibility is not raised at trial, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal will allow evidence that was available then to be called at appeal. It will not therefore substitute manslaughter for murder.
6. However, there are conflicting authorities. In R v Campbell [1987] 84 Cr App R 255, on a subsequent Home Secretary's reference, the Court of Appeal accepted medical evidence and ordered a retrial, but in R v Tony Martin [2002] 1 Cr App R 27, the Court of Appeal allowed medical evidence to be adduced at the appeal, even though diminished responsibility was not raised at trial.
7. The effect of alcohol consumed by the defendant cannot be ignored entirely. Section 2(1) does not require the abnormality of mind to be the sole cause of the killing, even if he would not have killed but for the additional impact of the alcohol, the section still provides a defence – R v Dietschmann (2003) 1 All ER 897 (disapproving R v Egan (1992) 4 All ER 470 and R v Atkinson 1985 CLR 314).
8. The effect of alcohol does not amount to an abnormality of mind due to inherent causes: R v Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261.
9. The effect of alcohol does not amount to an abnormality of mind due to inherent causes – c.f. R v Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261; R v Egan (1992) 4 All ER 470, R v Atkinson 1985 CLR 314. However, for cases of suggested alcoholism see R v Tandy (1989) 1 WLR 350 and R v Inseal 1992 CLR 35.
10. Even if a defendant cannot show diminished responsibility arising, for example, from brain damage as a result of alcohol, murder is a crime of specific intent. Therefore if the defendant was so drunk or drugged at the time of the killing as to be unable to form the intent to kill or cause GBH, he will be acquitted of murder. However he is still liable to be convicted of unlawful act manslaughter (see below).
11. There is a link between diminished responsibility and provocation: R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889.

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Provocation (Archbold 19-50)

1. Section 3 Homicide Act 1957: "Where on charge of murder:
• there is evidence on which the Jury can find the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self control,
• the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the Jury,
• and in determining the question the Jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect, which in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man".
2. The definition of provocation was given by Devlin J in R v Duffy (1949) 1 All ER 932 as approved in R v Whitfield (1976) 63 Cr App R 39:

"Provocation is some act or series of acts done or words spoken which would cause in any reasonable person and actually causes in the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self control rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him for the moment not master of his mind".

3. This is two-stage test, first subjective and then objective. Recent authorities have conflicted: Luc Thiet Thuan v R (1996) 2 All ER 1033 (Privy Council) held that a defendants mental impairment was not relevant to the second test, but R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) 4 All ER 289 (HOL) held, by a bare majority, that characteristics of a defendant, other than age and gender, could be relevant to the objective stage.
4. However, the recent decision of the Privy Council in R v Holley (2005) UKPC 23 concluded (6-3) that Smith (Morgan) was wrongly decided. This means that in determining the second stage, the personal characteristics of the defendant (other than age and gender) are not relevant in determining if the reasonable person would have acted as the defendant did even under the degree of provocation felt by the defendant. Holley has now been followed by the Court of Appeal in R v Faqir Mohammed – CLW/05/33/14.
5. The things said or done may be by the deceased or anyone else: R v Davis (1974) 60 Cr App R 253.
6. There must be a sudden and temporary loss of control and the loss of control must be associated with the act which caused death: R v Ibrams & Gregory (1981) 74 Cr App R 154.
7. Once there is evidence, whether from evidence called from the Crown or for the defence, sufficient to be left to the jury on the issue of provocation, the onus remains throughout upon the Crown to prove absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt (in contrast to diminished responsibility – see above).
8. Even if the defence is a denial of presence, if there is some evidence of possible provocation the judge must still direct the jury on provocation: R v Johnson (1989) 2 All ER 839 and R v Balogun 1999 EWCA Crim 2120. See also R v Rashford (2005) EWCA Crim 3377.
9. The judge should direct the jury on provocation even when it was not canvassed and was contrary to defence contentions: R v Cambridge (1994) 2 All ER 760 and this is the case even where the defendant denies any loss of self-control or being provoked: R v Stewart (1995) 4 All ER 999.
10. It is for judge to decide if there is some evidence but the judge is not required to put strained and implausible inferences to create provocation: R v Walch 1993 CLR 714 (however, note also R v Van Dongen (2005) EWCA Crim 1904).

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Involuntary manslaughter (Archbold 19-98)

1. Involuntary manslaughter is killing without the intent to kill or cause GBH. Apart from the absence of the requisite intent, all other elements of the offence are the same as for murder.
2. There are two types of involuntary manslaughter, namely:
• that caused by the defendant's gross negligence and
• that caused by his unlawful act.

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Gross negligence manslaughter (Archbold 19-108)

1. This is where the death is a result of a grossly negligent (though otherwise lawful) act or omission on the part of the defendant. In R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 the judge described the circumstances in which mere civil liability could become criminal liability in these terms:

"…the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others, as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment."

2. In R v Adomako (1994) 3 All ER 79 the law was clarified by the House of Lords, who affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, but amended the principles, stating:
• There is no separate offence of "motoring manslaughter" although manslaughter by unlawful act by the use of a car may be appropriate (see 'Killing with Cars after Adomako' Brownlee & Seneviratne 1995 CLR 35.) (And note R v Yaqoob - 2005 EWCA Crim 2169 – CLW/05/34/8.)
• There is no manslaughter by "Lawrence Recklessness", overruling R v Seymour (1983) 2 AC 493.
• There is a 4 stage test of gross negligence manslaughter, known as the Adomako Test which involves:
• A duty of care
• A breach of that duty of care
• Causing the death of the victim
• Whether that duty should be characterised as gross negligence, and therefore a crime.
3. In addition there is the case of R (Rowley) v DPP (2003) EWHC Admin 693 where the Administrative Court referred to a fifth test, that 'criminal' involved an element of 'badness' - but note that the Adomako test is objective and the Crown need not prove the defendant's state of mind. 'The risk must be a serious and obvious risk of death, not merely serious injury – R v Misra & Srivastava [2005] 1 Cr App R 328.

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Unlawful act manslaughter (Archbold 19-98)

1. This is where the killing is the result of:
• the defendant's unlawful act (not omission),
• where the unlawful act is one which all sober and reasonable people would realise would subject the victim to,
• the risk of some physical harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm – R v Williams & Davis (1992) 2 All ER 183,
• whether or not the defendant realised this.
2. The knowledge attributed to the sober and reasonable person is that which such a person would acquire as an observer of the whole course of the defendant's conduct throughout the unlawful act: R v Watson (1989) 2 All ER 865, R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150, R v Carey & others (2006) EWCA Crim 17.
3. In manslaughter arising from an unlawful and dangerous act, the accused's state of mind is relevant only to establish that the act was committed intentionally and that it was an unlawful act.
4. Once these points are established the question whether the act was dangerous is to be judged not by the appellant's appreciation but that of the sober and reasonable man and it is impossible to impute the mistaken belief of the defendant that what he was doing was not dangerous: R v Ball 1989 CLR 730.
5. Points to note:
• The defendant's act must be unlawful
• The act need not be directed against a person (e.g. arson) - see R v Willoughby (2005) 1 WLR 1880
• It must be an act, not an omission.

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Infanticide (Archbold 19-137)

1. Section 1 Infanticide Act 1938: "Where a woman:
• by any wilful act or omission
• causes death of her child being a child under the age of 12 months
• but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed
• by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child
• or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child
• then, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that, but for this Act, the offence would have amounted to murder
• she shall be guilty of an offence of infanticide
• and may for such an offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child".
2. The child that is killed must be the child to whom the birth etc refers, and the child must be under 12 months old.
3. Infanticide can be an alternative verdict or charged in its own right. The death can be by either act or omission.
4. In every case where the mother is alleged to have killed her own child who is less than 12 months old, early efforts should be made to obtain medical evidence establishing whether or not infanticide is appropriate and, if so, a charge of infanticide can be preferred pre-committal.
5. There is a close link between this offence with both voluntary manslaughter and diminished responsibility. However, unlike diminished responsibility, the burden of disproving is on prosecution. Although for an Infanticide offence, the child killed must be the one from whose birth/lactation the defendant is suffering; diminished responsibility might still be argued if another child of the family has been killed.
6. N.b. also the offence of Child Destruction: s.1 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which prohibits the killing of any child capable of being born alive.

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Familial deaths (Archbold 19-118a)

1. This new offence was created by s.5 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, to overcome the problems of intra-family abuse where nobody will give evidence against the perpetrator – c.f. R v Aston & Mason 527 S 89 CA 8/2/91.
2. Section 5 of the Act creates a new offence of causing or allowing the death of a child under the age of 16 or of a vulnerable adult. This stand-alone offence imposes a duty upon members of the same household who are over 16 (unless the defendants are the parents, in which case the age restriction does not apply) to:
• take reasonable steps to protect children or vulnerable adults within that household
• from the foreseeable significant risk of serious physical harm
• from the unlawful act or omission of other household members
• who had frequent contact with the victim.
3. The offence is triable only on indictment and carries a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment, or a fine, or both: s. 5(7).
4. An offence under section 5 is an offence of homicide for the purposes of venue in the Youth Court: s. 6(5).
5. The prosecution does not need to prove who actually committed the principal offence: s.5(2).
6. Section 6 of the act contains significant evidential provisions. Where a person is charged with murder (or manslaughter) and s.5, the judge may not dismiss the homicide count under Schedule 3, paragraph 2 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 unless the s.5 count is also dismissed: s.6(3).
7. During the trial itself, the homicide count must not be dismissed until after all the evidence has been heard unless the s.5 count is dismissed – s.6(4).
8. Where the accused does not give evidence, the jury may draw an adverse inference that he committed the homicide, even though there was otherwise no case to answer – s.6(2).
9. In assessing under the Code whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction on each count, the prosecutor is entitled to take into account the effect of s.6(2).

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Causation (Archbold 19-12)

1. The prosecution must always show a causal link between the act/omission and the death.
2. The act or omission must be a substantial cause of death, but it need not be the sole or main cause of death. It must have 'more than minimally negligibly or trivially contributed to the death.' - Lord Woolf MR in R v HM Coroner for Inner London ex p Douglas-Williams – (1998) 1 All ER 344.
3. It does not matter that the act/omission by the defendant merely "hastened" the victim's death: R v Dyson (1908) 1 Cr App R 13.
4. However, where it is alleged that an omission was a substantial cause of death, causation is particularly difficult. It is necessary to prove to the criminal standard that but for the omission the deceased would not have died.
5. To break the "chain of causation" an intervening act must be such that it becomes the sole cause of the victim's death so as to relieve the defendant of liability.
6. In Empress Cars Co (Abertillery) Ltd v National River Authority (1998) 1 All ER 481 the House of Lords decided that if you create a hazard, even if the damage results from the unlawful act of another, causation is still found unless that act is 'extraordinary'. However, that case arose from a statutory offence to protect the environment, and so was heavily criticised in R v Kennedy (Simon no 2) (2005) 1 WLR 2159. The Court of Appeal held that Empress Cars did not apply to non-regulatory offences.
7. Examples of intervening acts are:
• Third party interventions: such an act will not break the chain unless it was a free, deliberate, informed, voluntary act, which was not reasonably foreseeable by a reasonable person: R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279.
• Acts of God or nature can break the chain if entirely unforeseen and unconnected with the defendant's act.
• An act of the victim will break the chain if not within the range of response which might be anticipated from a victim in his situation: R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95 and R v Williams & Davis 1992 CLR 198.
• N.b. Reeves v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (HOL) 2000 1 AC 560 where it was accepted that if the police were aware that the prisoner was a known suicide risk then a special duty of care existed and that novus actus interveniens did not apply where he then went on to commit suicide.
• Death resulting from any normal medical treatment employed to deal with a criminal injury must be regarded as caused by the criminal injury. It is only in the most extraordinary case that treatment designed to repair the harm done by the original attack could be regarded as the cause of the victim's death to the exclusion of the accused's act: R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All ER 670.
8. The defendant must take his victim as he finds him under the 'egg-shell skull' rule: R v LeBrun (1991) 4 All ER 673.

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Self defence (Archbold 19-41)

1. Self defence is as much a defence to murder and manslaughter as to any other offence. As with all cases of offences against the person, when considering the sufficiency of evidence under the Code, if it is plain that such a defence is likely to succeed it would not be right to commence proceedings.
2. If there is evidence to support self-defence, the burden falls on the prosecution to rebut it beyond reasonable doubt, i.e. to prove that the accused was not acting in self defence.
3. This is a two-stage test, the first part is subjective: from the accused's perspective and the second is objective: the "reasonable man" test.
• Stage 1: Did the accused genuinely believe that force was necessary to protect himself or another?
• Stage 2: If the defendant genuinely held that belief, even if it was irrational, then was the degree of force used reasonable to meet the threat as he perceived it to be?
4. In self-defence cases, the jury must be directed to the question of whether a defendant's response was commensurate with the degree of risk he or she believed to be created by the threatened assault: Beckford v R (1987) 3 All ER 425.
5. When considering the reasonableness of the force used in self defence, a person cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action (see Palmer v R (1971) 55 Cr App R 223). He does not have to retreat as far as he can and does not have to wait until he is struck, retreat is merely a factor to take into account in deciding if D is the aggressor or not – R v Bird (Debbie) (1985) 2 All ER 813.

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Attempted murder (Archbold 19-91)

1. There must be an intention to kill, not merely to cause grievous bodily harm: R v Grimwood (1962) 3 All ER 285. The requisite intention to kill can be inferred by the circumstances: R v Walker & Hayles (1990) 90 Cr App R 226.
2. Duress is not a defence to a charge of attempted murder.

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Procedure

Code for Crown Prosecutors – considerations

1. Murder is so serious that a prosecution is almost certainly required even in cases such as 'mercy killing' of a sick relative.
2. The personal circumstances of a defendant may be a relevant public interest factor in exceptional circumstances.

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Charging practice

1. A count of murder should refer to the date of death, not the date of the act that caused the death.
2. The prosecution cannot indict a defendant for manslaughter based on an acceptable plea to diminished responsibility or provocation. Such pleas may only be accepted to a count of murder.
3. Infanticide as an alternative to murder should be preferred where a mother has killed her child before it reached 12 months of age; and there is medical evidence that the balance of the mother's mind was disturbed, either because she had not fully recovered from the effects of the birth of the child; or because of the effect of lactation on her.
4. An alternative count of aiding and abetting suicide, contrary to section 2 Suicide Act, should be considered where there is evidence of the defendant aiding and abetting someone else to commit suicide, rather than evidence of a suicide pact.
5. Please refer to the Specimen indictment on the Case Management System - Indictment Builder.

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Acceptability of Pleas

1. Before accepting a plea to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, there should be:
• a satisfactory psychiatric report that concludes that the defendant fulfils the criteria set out in section 2(1) Homicide Act 1957
• agreement between the police, CPS and counsel
• consultation with the family of the victim

Be cautious where

• the report's findings depend on certain facts provided by the defendant which cannot be proven by independent evidence
• or where there are a number of specialist reports which give conflicting opinions of whether the defendant fulfils the criteria
• or the medical evidence appears to be straining to bring a defendant within the criteria.
2. Before accepting a plea to manslaughter on the ground of provocation, ensure that:
• the investigating officer has been consulted; and
• the CPS and counsel are satisfied that there is insufficient evidence to continue with murder; and
• the family of the victim have been consulted.
3. A plea to manslaughter on the grounds of a suicide pact may be accepted where all the evidence, all the medical reports and the representations from the defence are available. Ensure also that the family of the victim have been consulted.

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Internal referral requirements

1. The following cases must be notified to your CCP or designated officer as soon as practicable:
• murder;
• conspiracy to commit murder;
• attempted murder;
• concealment of birth;
• infanticide;
• aiding and abetting suicide.
2. Cases involving the following factual scenarios must be forwarded to your CCP or designated officer:
• any proceedings under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, refer to Consents to prosecute, elsewhere in this guidance;
• 'mercy' killings;
• homicide committed by members of the medical or allied professions while acting in their professional capacity;
• cases in which there is likely to be exceptional public concern due to the circumstances of the offence, the suspect or the victim or otherwise;
• disaster cases involving death;
• any case involving a death in police or prison custody.

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Medical reports for the court

1. In every murder case, the court will require a report about the defendant's medical condition. However, following the case of R v Reid – Times Law Report 12 November 2001, there is now no requirement for the Crown to obtain a medical report for the Court's benefit. You should make yourself aware of any local arrangements made by Crown Courts in your Area.

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Pathologist's reports and other medical issues

1. Do not send a case of murder without receipt of a pathologist's statement covering the cause of death. Release the pathologist's statement to the defence as quickly as possible so that they may arrange a second post-mortem if required or so that the coroner may release the deceased's body.
2. In cases where a request is received for the removal of an organ for transplant purposes, refer the request to the CCP or designated lawyer.

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Bail

1. The court must give reasons for grant of bail in cases of murder, manslaughter or attempt murder: s 9A Bail Act 1976.
2. Under s 56 Crime & Disorder Act 1998 there is a rebuttable presumption that no person charged with murder, manslaughter or attempted murder shall be granted bail, if previously convicted for any such offence and, in the case of manslaughter, sentenced to imprisonment (or detention if a child). However, note now the decision in Ilijokov v Bulgaria 2001 7 Archbold News 1.
3. If a person charged with murder is granted bail, there is a mandatory bail condition which has to be imposed. Under section 3(6A) Bail Act 1976, a court that releases a defendant on bail when charged with murder must impose at least 2 bail conditions:
• a requirement that the defendant undergoes examination by 2 medical practitioners, one of whom has been approved for the purposes of s.12 Mental Health Act 1983; and
• a requirement that the defendant attends for examination when directed by the court.
4. Prosecutors who are minded to recommend that a defendant charged with murder might be bailed should be in a position to suggest a place of examination to be specified in a bail condition. Contact the Senior Medical Officer at the local prison nearest the court or telephone the Duty Principal Medical Officer at the Prison Health Policy Unit and Task Force, Wellington House, 133-135 Waterloo Road, London SE1 8YG (Tel: 020 7972 4483).

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The victim's family

1. You must keep any close relatives of the deceased informed of the case's progress, refer to Care and treatment of victims and witnesses, elsewhere in this guidance.

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Other matters

1. Only photographs which are necessary for the presentation of the case should be compiled by the police into an album. Take special care when instructing the investigating officer to avoid distress for the jury and for the relatives.
2. Material which should be submitted to the Probation Service in the preparation of Pre-Sentence Reports, refer to Disclosure for pre-sentence reports, elsewhere in this guidance.

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Procedure - post-trial

1. The police will provide the Home Office with details of the indictment in all cases where the defendant has been convicted.
2. The police also have responsibility for providing any relevant information to the Prison and Probation Services, not the CPS.
3. Any request under the National Protocol Regarding the Passage of Information in Respect of Homicide Life Sentence Prisoners should be referred to the officer in the case.
4. The Benefits Agency should be notified, following a conviction of a person for killing his or her spouse or partner.

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Useful references

Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority (1991) 1 All ER 801 and AG Ref No 3 of 1994 (1997) 3 All ER 936
Law Reform (Year & a Day Rule) Act, 1996
Consents to prosecute, elsewhere in this guidance
Section 9 Offences against the Person Act 1861
R v Woollin [1999] 1 Cr App R 8 (HOL)
Section 2(1) Homicide Act 1957
R v. Byrne (1960) 44 Cr App R 246
R v Campbell [1987] 84 Cr App R 255
R v Kooken [1982] 74 Cr App R 30
R v Sanders [1991] Crim LR 781
R v Tony Martin [2002] 1 Cr App R 27
R v Dietschmann (2003) 1 All ER 897
R v Egan (1992) 4 All ER 470
R v Atkinson 1985 CLR 314
R v Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261
R v Tandy (1989) 1 WLR 350
R v Inseal 1992 CLR 35
R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889
Section 3 Homicide Act 1957
R v Duffy (1949) 1 All ER 932
R v Whitfield (1976) 63 Cr App R 39
Thiet Thuan v R (1996) 2 All ER 1033 (Privy Council)
R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) 4 All ER 289 (HOL)
R v Holley (2005) UKPC 23
R v Faqir Mohammed – CLW/05/33/14
R v Davis (1974) 60 Cr App R 253
R v Ibrams & Gregory (1981) 74 Cr App R 154
R v Johnson (1989) 2 All ER 839
R v Balogun 1999 EWCA Crim 2120
R v Rashford (2005) EWCA Crim 3377
R v Cambridge (1994) 2 All ER 760
R v Stewart (1995) 4 All ER 999
R v Walch 1993 CLR 714
R v Van Dongen (2005) EWCA Crim 1904
R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8
R v Adomako (1994) 3 All ER 79
R v Yaqoob - 2005 EWCA Crim 2169 – CLW/05/34/8.
R v Seymour (1983) 2 AC 493
R (Rowley) v DPP (2003) EWHC Admin 693
R v Misra & Srivastava [2005] 1 Cr App R 328
R v Williams & Davis (1992) 2 All ER 183
R v Watson (1989) 2 All ER 865
R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150
R v Carey & others (2006) EWCA Crim 17
R v Ball 1989 CLR 730
R v Willoughby (2005) 1 WLR 1880
Section 1 Infanticide Act 1938
s.1 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929
s.5 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004
R v Aston & Mason 527 S 89 CA 8/2/91
Schedule 3, paragraph 2 Crime and Disorder Act 1998
R v HM Coroner for Inner London ex p Douglas-Williams – (1998) 1 All ER 344
R v Dyson (1908) 1 Cr App R 13
Empress Cars Co (Abertillery) Ltd v National River Authority (1998) 1 All ER 481
R v Kennedy (Simon no 2) (2005) 1 WLR 2159
R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279
R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95
R v Williams & Davis 1992 CLR 198
Reeves v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (HOL) 2000 1 AC 560
R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All ER 670
R v LeBrun (1991) 4 All ER 673
Beckford v R (1987) 3 All ER 425
Palmer v R (1971) 55 Cr App R 223
R v Bird (Debbie) (1985) 2 All ER 813
R v Grimwood (1962) 3 All ER 285
R v Walker & Hayles (1990) 90 Cr App R 226
section 2(1) Homicide Act 1957
R v Reid – Times Law Report 12 November 2001
s 9A Bail Act 1976
s 56 Crime & Disorder Act 1998
Ilijokov v Bulgaria 2001 7 Archbold News 1
s.12 Mental Health Act 1983
Care and treatment of victims and witnesses, elsewhere in this guidance
Disclosure for pre-sentence reports, elsewhere in this guidance

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