Road Traffic Offences - Prosecuting Cases of Bad Driving

Introduction

The offences dealt with in this guidance include the most serious of all road traffic offences. Prosecution is not only vital to the enforcement and promotion of road safety and the protection of the public, but is also key to the public confidence of victims and their families in the criminal justice system.

Bad driving resulting in death or injury has devastating consequences for victims and their families and friends, and it is important that justice is seen to be done in cases where this has happened.

The CPS is committed to ensuring that in such cases our prosecutors reach the correct charging decisions, so that the right person is prosecuted for the right offence in the right court.

For this to be achieved these decisions must be in line with current law, but also, where it is just and lawful to do so, they should reflect changing public attitudes to bad driving and the desire of victims, or their families, friends and the public, to see that justice is done in these cases.

In 2002 Her Majesty's CPS Inspectorate (HMCPSI) undertook a review of the way in which the CPS was handling road traffic cases involving fatalities (A Report on the Thematic Review of the Advice Conduct and Prosecution by the Crown Prosecution Service of Road Traffic Offences involving Fatalities in England and Wales - available at http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/reports/RoadTrafficReport0302.pdf). That review found that in the large majority of cases under review the correct charge was chosen by the CPS.

In 2006 the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) acknowledged that, notwithstanding the findings of the HMCPSI report, there were occasions where victims or their families and friends did not agree with the decisions made by the CPS or found them hard to accept or understand.

Public attitudes to bad driving have changed as was shown in a public consultation carried out in by the Home Office in 2004. Following that consultation Parliament passed the Road Safety Act 2006, which introduced new offences of causing death by careless driving and causing death while driving unlawfully on a road

The DPP decided that the time was right for the CPS to review its prosecution policies and guidance for dealing with cases of bad driving, and that this review should also be informed by a wide public consultation, which was launched in December 2006 as 'Prosecuting Bad Driving - A Consultation on CPS Policy and Practice'.

The purpose of the consultation was to open up the CPS practices and procedures and to explain how CPS prosecutors reach their decisions in these cases, because the CPS wants the public to have confidence in the decisions that we make.

We have now issued a public policy statement, the 'CPS Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Bad Driving', on how we will deal with cases involving bad driving and this guidance should be read in conjunction with that policy.

In 2008, HMCPSI undertook a follow-up inspection, the report from which is available at http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/reports/RTO_thm_rpt_Nov08.pdf. This Legal Guidance has been amended to reflect comments and recommendations made by HMCPSI in this second report.

What is Bad Driving?

There is no statutory definition of bad driving, but there are a number of general offences covered by this guidance that directly concern or may relate to the way in which a vehicle is driven. These are:

• murder;
• manslaughter;
• causing death by dangerous driving;
• causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs;
• dangerous driving;
• causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving;
• causing death by driving whilst unlicensed;
• uninsured or disqualified;
• careless or inconsiderate driving;
• wanton and furious driving; and
• aggravated vehicle taking.

Charging

General Charging Practice

Prosecutors should always have in mind the following general principles when selecting the appropriate charge(s): 

• the charge(s) should accurately reflect the extent of the accused's alleged involvement and responsibility, thereby allowing the courts the discretion to sentence appropriately;
• the choice of charges should ensure the clear and simple presentation of the case particularly when there is more than one accused;
• there should be no overloading of charges by selecting more charges than are necessary just to encourage the accused to plead guilty to a few; and 
• there should be no overcharging by selecting a charge which is not supported by the evidence in order to encourage a plea to a lesser allegation.

General Issues about bad driving offences

Consumption of alcohol or drugs

Assessing the relevance of the consumption of alcohol (or drugs) is a difficult area. R v Woodward (Terence) [1994] 1 WLR 374 (CA), which concerns alcohol consumption, set out 2 general principles: 

• the mere fact that the driver has consumed alcohol is not of itself relevant to or admissible on the question of whether his driving is careless or dangerous; and 
• for such evidence to be admissible, it must tend to show that the amount of alcohol taken was such as would adversely affect a reasonable driver, or alternatively, that the accused was in fact adversely affected. 

A similar approach should be followed with drugs.

Commission of a number of offences

There will be cases where the evidence shows a course of conduct, which involves the commission of a number of statutory or regulatory offences that are very close in time with one another. For example, a driver may drive through a red traffic light, ignore a pelican crossing and fail to give way at a junction within the same course of driving.

The court needs to be made aware of the link between what might otherwise appear as isolated incidents, which in reality form part of a more serious course of conduct. Where this type of situation arises, the manner of the driving has, in reality, fallen below or far below that expected of a competent and careful driver because of the driver's systematic failure to obey the relevant traffic directions. In such circumstances, consider charging careless or dangerous driving (according to the evidence) rather than a number of individual statutory or regulatory offences.

Nearest and Dearest Cases

In the past, the CPS has adopted a different approach in cases where a death has occurred and the deceased was in a close personal or family relationship with the driver. It was based on the principle that the driver has suffered such enormous personal loss that it would be oppressive and insensitive to prosecute the driver for the bad driving offence that led to the death.

While we must always be able to exercise discretion in cases where a prosecution would be oppressive or insensitive, the public interest will normally demand that a prosecution takes place in cases of causing death by dangerous driving or causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs or failing to provide a specimen.

Sections 20 and 21 of the Road Safety Act 2006 introduce new offences of causing death by careless driving and causing death by driving whilst uninsured, disqualified or unlicensed. In these cases prosecutors should consider the extent to which the driver was culpable.

Drivers of service vehicles, and drivers in emergencies

Members of the emergency services do not enjoy any special exemption from prosecution when responding to emergency calls: they owe the same duty of care as a member of the public.

Nevertheless, when a member of the emergency services commits an offence while responding to an emergency call, discretion should be used in deciding whether or not a prosecution is needed in the public interest. A prosecution is unlikely to be appropriate in cases of genuine emergency unless the driving is dangerous or indicates a high degree of blameworthiness.

In each case it is necessary to weigh all the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the emergency known to, or reasonably perceived by, the driver and the nature of the driving.

There will be cases when persons who are not members of the emergency services drive in an emergency. Examples include doctors who receive an urgent call for assistance and a driver taking a sick child to hospital. As with members of the emergency services, all the circumstances of the case must be weighed, particularly the nature of the emergency known to, or reasonably perceived by, the driver and the nature of the driving.

Injury to the offender

The Sentencing Guidelines Council considers that injuries to the offender may be a mitigating factor when sentencing ('Causing Death by Driving' Guideline, page 5, paragraph 22). The severity of any injuries should not, however, have any influence on the decision to charge, and the general principles set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors should be applied.

Factors that are not relevant in deciding on level of charge

The following factors are not relevant when deciding whether an act of driving is careless or dangerous: 

• the injury or death of one or more persons involved in a road traffic collision, except where Parliament has made specific provision for the death to be reflected in the charge. Importantly, injury or death does not, by itself, turn a collision into careless driving or turn careless driving into dangerous driving (but multiple deaths do aggravate the public interest consideration once a decision has been made to prosecute on the evidence, where the driving has deliberately put more than one person at risk or where the occurrence of multiple deaths was reasonably foreseeable. Multiple deaths are also an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes (Sentencing Guidelines Council: 'Causing Death by Driving' Guideline, page 5, paragraph 19)); 
• the age or experience of the driver; 
• the commission of other driving offences at the same time (such as driving whilst disqualified or driving without a certificate of insurance or a driving licence); 
• the fact that the defendant has previous convictions for road traffic offences; and 
• the disability of a driver caused by mental illness or by physical injury or illness, except where there is evidence that the disability adversely affected the manner of the driving.

Fatality or serious injury cases - Seizure of Vehicles

In cases where a fatality or serious injury results during the period of the unauthorised taking of the vehicle, as a result of it being driven dangerously, then consideration should be given to the seizure and retention of the vehicle in its post-collision condition until the conclusion of the case, and any periods for an appeal. This allows an opportunity for expert examination of the vehicle.

This is because the condition of the vehicle involved in a road collision may be relevant in explaining why the collision happened, for example, a mechanical defect. In this respect, the Court of Appeal has stated in the case of (R v Beckford 1996 1 Cr.App. R 93) that the police should never give permission for a vehicle to be scrapped where serious charges are to be brought, which might involve the possibility of some mechanical defect to the vehicle as a potential issue in the case.

Prosecutors should also be aware of the need to balance the rights of the owner of vehicles under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (Right to Peaceful Enjoyment of Property) against a defendant's right to a Fair Trial under Article 6 of the Convention - see Casework Bulletin 9 of 1999 and ECHR Manual of Guidance.

Compensation should be considered in appropriate cases. In particular Prosecutors should be aware that those involved in offences of taking vehicles contrary to section 12 and 12A of the Theft Act 1968 will not be insured. In such cases compensation should be claimed where appropriate. In this respect Prosecutors should be aware of the scheme operated by the Motor Insurers Bureau and that under the scheme the victim has to meet the first £300 of a claim.

Prosecuting cases of bad driving

Prosecutors should adopt a proactive approach to seeking further information from the police before a charging decision is made. In all cases, prosecutors should liaise directly with the officer in the case to make sure all available evidence has been obtained and sent to the CPS so that it may be fully reviewed. If necessary, prosecutors should advise the police to follow up other lines of enquiry.

CPS Charging Practice

Levels of Authority

It is very important, for reasons of public confidence, that there is consistent, high quality decision making in cases where there has been a fatality.

Accordingly, the Director requires that charging decisions in all fatal collision cases should be approved by a Chief Crown Prosecutor (CCP).

Similarly, any decision to accept a plea to a lesser offence should also be approved at the same level (See later in this guidance for the need for CCPs to approve mode of trial decisions for offences of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving and causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured) .

Sentencing Guidelines Council

The Sentencing Council published its definitive Guideline: 'Causing Death by Driving' on 15 July 2008, for offences sentenced on or after 4 August 2008 (http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/index.html).

The Guideline covers four offences, namely: causing death by dangerous driving; causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs; causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving; and causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured.

The Guideline describes how the seriousness of an offence should be determined. There are five factors, general to all the offences covered by the Guideline (except causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, where the standard of driving is irrelevant) that determine the seriousness of the offence:

Awareness of risk
(a) a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of very bad driving;

Effect of alcohol or drugs
(b) consumption of alcohol above the legal limit;
(c) consumption of alcohol at or below the legal limit where this impaired the offender's ability to drive;
(d) failure to supply a specimen for analysis;
(e) consumption of illegal drugs, where this impaired the offender's ability to drive; and
(f) consumption of legal drugs or medication where this impaired the offender's ability to drive (including legal medication known to cause drowsiness) where the driver knew, or should have known, about the likelihood of impairment.

Inappropriate speed of vehicle
(g) greatly excessive speed; racing; competitive driving against another vehicle;
(h) driving above the speed limit;
(i) driving at a speed that is inappropriate for the prevailing road or weather conditions; and
(j) driving a PSV, HGV or other goods vehicle at a speed that is inappropriate either because of the nature of the vehicle or its load, especially when carrying passengers.

Seriously culpable behaviour of offender
(k) aggressive driving (such as driving much too close to the vehicle in front, persistent inappropriate attempts to overtake, or cutting in after overtaking);
(l) driving while using a hand-held mobile phone;
(m) driving whilst the driver's attention is avoidably distracted, for example by reading or adjusting the controls of electronic equipment such as a radio, hands-free mobile phone or satellite navigation equipment;
(n) driving when knowingly suffering from a medical or physical condition that significantly impairs the offender's driving skills, including failure to take prescribed medication;
(o) driving when knowingly deprived of adequate sleep or rest, especially where commercial concerns had a bearing on the commission of the offence; and
(p) driving a poorly maintained or dangerously loaded vehicle, especially where commercial concerns had a bearing on the commission of the offence.

Victim
(q) failing to have proper regard to vulnerable road users.

The Guideline (at pages 3-5) sets out examples of how the above determinants may be demonstrated. The death of more than one person increases the degree of harm.

Once the seriousness has been determined, the sentencing court should move to the relevant starting point given for the specific offences in the Guideline. From there, the aggravating and mitigating factors are taken into account to increase or decrease the starting point (usually within a given range); then the personal mitigation and any reduction for a guilty plea are considered.

The Guideline is an essential reference point for prosecutors deciding upon the most suitable venue for trial in offences triable either way, namely: causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving; and causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. The Guideline supersedes guidelines set out in case law.

Murder and Manslaughter

Code for Crown Prosecutors

Murder and manslaughter are so serious that a prosecution is almost certainly required where the evidence is sufficient.

The personal circumstances of a defendant may be a relevant public interest factor in exceptional circumstances.

The Law

If the vehicle was intentionally used as a weapon to kill then a charge of murder may be considered. If the killing was involuntary then it may amount to an offence of manslaughter. Manslaughter may arise in two different ways: unlawful act manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter.

Manslaughter is an obligatorily disqualifiable offence (Part II of Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 Schedule 2). An extended retest is also mandatory.

Unlawful act manslaughter [Archbold 19-99]

It must be proved that:

• the defendant's act caused the death of the victim; 
• the defendant's act constituted a criminal offence in itself; 
• the defendant had the mens rea appropriate to the unlawful act which caused the victim's death; and 
• the defendant's unlawful act is objectively recognised as subjecting the victim to the risk of some physical harm, albeit not necessarily serious harm.

Unlawful act manslaughter will be the most appropriate charge when there is evidence to prove that a vehicle is used as an instrument of attack (but where the necessary intent for murder is absent) or to cause fright and death results.

In the context of driving offences it is important to remember that there is a difference between bad driving cases where there is a specific unlawful act and those where a death has occurred as a result of driving that is unlawful only because of the negligent manner of its performance.

In the House of Lords case of Andrews v DPP ([1937] A.C. 576), Lord Atkin stated that there was 'an obvious difference in the law of manslaughter between doing an unlawful act and doing a lawful act with a degree of carelessness that the Legislature makes criminal'. Thus an act that is otherwise lawful, such as driving a vehicle, does not become an unlawful act for these purposes if it contravenes the criminal law merely by the manner of its execution. Hence, driving carelessly or driving dangerously do not, on their own, amount to unlawful acts for the purpose of unlawful act manslaughter.

Unlawful act manslaughter should, therefore, only be charged instead of causing death by dangerous driving where there is evidence that the driver either intended to cause injury to the victim or was reckless as to whether injury would be caused. This will be decided after considering the circumstances of each case.

In cases where a death has occurred as a result of bad driving and it is clear from the available evidence that the standard of driving has been grossly negligent on the part of the driver, a charge of gross negligence manslaughter will be the correct charge.

Gross negligence manslaughter [Archbold 19-108]

To prove a charge based on gross negligence manslaughter, the prosecution must show that the defendant owes the victim a duty of care; that they are in breach of that duty; have caused the death; that the driving falls far below the minimum acceptable standard of driving; and there is an obvious and serious risk of death; and the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as, in the opinion of the jury, to amount to a crime (R v Adomako [1993] 3 All ER 79).

The ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply when considering whether there is such a duty. There is a general duty of care on all persons not to do acts imperilling the lives of others.

Manslaughter is also discussed at Wilkinson's 5.37. At 5.40, Wilkinson's argues that in one factual scenario a "hit and run" driver might be guilty of manslaughter. Consideration should be given to this in appropriate cases where there is clear evidence to satisfy all the above elements.

The examples of driving which fall far below the minimum acceptable standard of driving see dangerous driving (see below).

Choosing the correct offence

The responses to the CPS public consultation showed that some sections of the public consider that we should often charge gross negligence manslaughter instead of causing death by dangerous driving.

Two arguments were put forward in support of this view:

• first, that the public is now increasingly less tolerant of bad driving and convictions for gross negligence manslaughter may be more likely; and 
• secondly, because manslaughter carries a higher maximum penalty, it better reflects the gravity of the offence.

However, the position is not straightforward. Prosecutors have a number of statutory offences available to them (causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving, either with or without the additional element of drink or drugs) in cases where there has been a fatal collision caused by bad driving. Gross negligence manslaughter should not, therefore, be charged unless there is something to set the case apart from one where one of the statutory offences can be proved. This will normally be evidence to show a very high risk of death, making the case one of the utmost gravity.

As a matter of law it is more difficult to prove an offence of gross negligence manslaughter than it is to prove an offence of causing death by dangerous driving. It is not necessary to have evidence of an obvious and serious risk of death to prove an offence of causing death by dangerous driving. All that is required is evidence that the driving was dangerous and that the driving caused the death of another person.

Whilst it is correct that the offence of manslaughter carries the possibility of a more severe sentence than an offence of causing death by dangerous driving, the courts have, over the years, generally passed sentences well within - sometimes significantly below - the maximum sentence available for causing death by dangerous driving.

The provisions of Section 33 of the Road Safety Act 2006 now allow a jury to return an alternative verdict to a charge of manslaughter for one of four offences, including causing death by dangerous driving, if they do not find that there is sufficient evidence to convict of manslaughter but think the evidence was sufficient to prove any of those four offences. In addition to causing death by dangerous driving, the three other offences are dangerous driving; causing death by careless driving whilst under the influence of drink or drugs; and furious driving.

The new provision provides the prosecution with a safety net that has not previously existed in motor manslaughter cases, where it has never been possible to pursue charges of manslaughter and causing death by dangerous driving in the alternative as a result of the decision in R v Seymour [1983] [RTR] 455 per Lord Roskill).

Section 33 has not overturned the decision in Seymour and it remains the case that alternative charges may not be put on the indictment, but it is now open to prosecutors to charge manslaughter in bad driving cases where there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction for that offence, without the risk that previously existed, that a jury would be unable to return an alternative verdict even though they might think a lesser offence has been proved at trial.

It is essential that the charge that is the most appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, is always preferred. It will never be appropriate to charge a more serious offence in order to obtain a conviction (whether by plea or verdict) to a lesser offence.

In most cases where a death occurs as a result of dangerous driving, the statutory offence of causing death by dangerous driving will remain the correct charge.

Corporate Manslaughter

On occasion it will be apparent that working regimes, dangerous or illegal practices, or negligence have contributed to the death. In these circumstances liability may arise either in respect of corporate bodies or in respect of officers within those bodies.

The normal principles of "gross negligence manslaughter" must be followed to determine liability. A clear line of causation must be shown from the directing or controlling mind through to the unlawful act or omission. The following are examples of where corporate or individual "officer" responsibility may arise: 

• an operator has no regular system of preventative checks, showing indifference to an obvious risk of injury; 
• or a company director knows about a defect in the vehicle and allows it to go out before the defect has been repaired, showing an appreciation of the risk but a determination to run that risk; 
• a substandard repair is done to a defective part; and 
• an operator fails to ensure that drivers of vehicles work proper hours and have appropriate rest periods.

'Off Road' Offences

Manslaughter should also be considered where the driving has occurred other than on a road or other public place, or when the vehicle driven was not mechanically propelled, and death has been caused. In these cases the statutory offences do not apply.

Causing death by dangerous driving (Section 1 RTA 1988)

Definition of the offence (Archbold 32-2) (Wilkinson 5.24).

This offence is committed when the driving of the accused was a cause of the death of another person and the driving was dangerous within the meaning of section 2A of the Act (see Dangerous Driving elsewhere in Legal Guidance).

Causation

The manner of the defendant's driving must have been a cause of the death. (Contrast this with causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured (section 3ZB) where there is no direct causal link between the nature of the offending behaviour and the death and which does not involve any fault in the standard of driving - see below).

The defendant's driving need not be the sole, principal or even a substantial cause of the death. It need only be beyond a negligible cause of the death. The leading authority is R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133 where the court said:

"...there is nothing in the statute which requires the manner of the driving to be a substantial cause or a major cause or any other description of cause, of the accident. So long as the dangerous driving is a cause and something more than de minimis, the statute operates".

The Court of Appeal in R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 approved the expression 'more than a slight or trifling link' as a useful way of explaining 'de minimis' to the jury.

Although proving causation in fatal collision cases is usually straightforward, prosecutors should be alive to the fact that it is possible (though this is likely to be extremely rare) for a vehicle to be driven carelessly or dangerously without the careless or dangerous act or omission being causative of death. For example, causation may not be made out where a driver was avoidably distracted by something in the car, and suddenly a pedestrian stepped out into the road and was so close to the driver's car that a collision was inevitable, even if the driver had been paying full attention. Here, the death that occurred was unavoidable, irrespective of the manner of the driving.

Another example where causation may be difficult to prove might be where there has been a collision between two cars, whereupon a third vehicle, being driven by a driver who was momentarily distracted or who failed to react sufficiently to the situation, ploughed into the crash scene. Where the drivers of the first or second vehicles suffered fatal injuries, it might not be clear whether the subsequent dangerous or careless driving was a cause of death.

The examples given in relation to dangerous driving apply to this offence see dangerous driving elsewhere in Legal Guidance.

It is an offence triable only on indictment and carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment, by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and/or an unlimited fine.

The court must disqualify the driver from driving for at least 2 years, unless special reasons are found for not disqualifying (in which case it must endorse the driver's licence with 3 - 11 penalty points, again, unless there are special reasons not to do so). An extended retest is also mandatory.

Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs (Section 3A RTA 1988)

The Law

Definition of the offence (Archbold 32-55) (Wilkinson 5.87).

This offence is committed when: 

• the driving was without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other roads users; and 
• the driving has caused the death of another person; and
• the driver is either unfit through drink or drugs, or the alcohol concentration is over the prescribed limited, or there has been a failure to provide a specimen in pursuance of the RTA 1988 (Wilkinson, 5.87 - 5.95).

The defendant's driving must have been a cause of the death - see Causing death by dangerous driving earlier in this guidance and R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133.

The examples given in respect of careless driving apply to this offence; refer to Careless Driving (see below).

The offence is triable only on indictment and carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment, by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and/or an unlimited fine.

The court must disqualify the driver from driving for at least 2 years (3 years if there is a relevant previous conviction), unless special reasons are found for not disqualifying (in which case it must endorse the driver's licence with 3 - 11 penalty points, again, unless there are special reasons not to do so). An extended retest is also mandatory.

Charging Practice

Proper procedures have to have been adopted in the requesting and/or obtaining of any sample of breath, blood or urine. In cases where the procedures are flawed, there is a risk that the evidence may be excluded. Where this is possible, careful consideration must be given to whether the remaining evidence will support an alternative allegation of causing death by careless driving while unfit to drive through drink/drugs, in which case, evidence other than that from an intoximeter machine can be relied upon to demonstrate the defendant's unfitness to drive.

It is not necessary to add a further charge relating to drink/driving when the defendant is charged with a section 3A offence, because a guilty verdict to the relevant drink/drive offence can be returned by the jury under the statutory provisions. This is also true of section 2B, causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving; refer to alternative verdicts (see below).

Relationship between section 1 and section 3A RTA 1988

Offences under section 1 and section 3A carry the same maximum penalty, so the choice of charge will not inhibit the court's sentencing powers. The courts have made it clear that for sentencing purposes the two offences are to be regarded on an equal basis (Attorney General's Reference (No.39 of 1993); R v Brown [1994] Crim LR 337; R v Locke [1994] Crim LR 338) although the SGC Guideline 'Causing Death by Driving' (http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/guidelines) gives a greater range of sentences for section 3A offences, depending upon the amount of alcohol or drugs consumed (at page 13).

The consumption of alcohol is an aggravating feature within the definition of section 3A. The consumption of alcohol is not part of the definition of section 1 but may be treated as an aggravating feature in appropriate cases. (See the SGC Guideline, as above.)

Where a section 1 offence can be proved, it should be charged. However, prosecutors may, on occasions, have to decide which is the more appropriate charge: section 1 or section 3A. This will almost always occur when the manner of the driving is on the borderline between careless and dangerous. The prosecution is likely to be put to election if the two offences are charged in the alternative. Where this is the case, section 3A should be chosen provided all the other elements of that offence can be proved. The prospects of a conviction will be greater and the court's sentencing powers remain unaffected.

Alternative counts

There may be rare occasions where the only issue to be decided is the degree to which the driving fell below the required standard and there is a genuine triable factual issue between the prosecution and the defence. As Section 3A is not an available alternative verdict to Section 1 it may be necessary to put both counts on the indictment to give effect to the ability of a jury to reach a verdict. Such situations will be rare and must be capable of justification, especially since section 2B is a statutory alternative verdict to section 1. Refer to alternative verdicts (see below).

Causing death by careless driving (Section 2B RTA 1988)

The Law

(Archbold 32-47a) (Wilkinson 5.96)

Section 21 RSA creates a new section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988:

"A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence".

The offence was brought into force on 18 August 2008. The maximum penalty for the offence is 5 years' imprisonment with a mandatory minimum period of disqualification of twelve months (or 3 -11 points where special reasons are found not to disqualify).

The definition of careless driving is contained in section 3ZA RTA 88 as driving at a standard: "below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver". There is also a requirement to have regard: "not only to the circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused": (3ZA(3)).

The definition of inconsiderate driving is contained in section 3ZA (4) RTA, which states:

"A person is to be regarded as driving without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by his driving".

(For more on the difference between careless driving and inconsiderate driving, see Wilkinson's Road Traffic Offences at 5.45.).

The examples given in this guidance for careless and inconsiderate driving apply to this offence;  refer to Careless Driving (see below).

The defendant's driving must have been a cause of the death (refer to Causing death by dangerous driving earlier in this guidance) and R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133.

Charging Practice

Charges under the new provisions must be decided by a Crown Prosecutor since, under the Director's Guidance on Charging, the police may not determine the charge in cases where the circumstances have resulted in the death of any person.

As is the case for causing death by dangerous driving, the circumstances of every case will be unique and must be considered on the merits before reaching a decision as to the appropriate level of charge.

The test that prosecutors will apply to the standard of driving will not change. However, if you decide that the driving was careless (or inconsiderate) and that it caused a death, the appropriate charge will be causing death by careless driving (or causing death by inconsiderate driving).

The difference between causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving lies in the standard of the driving. For causing death by dangerous driving, the standard of driving must fall far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver. For causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, the standard of driving must fall below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver. For more on when to charge careless driving (see below) and Wilkinson's Road Traffic Offences at 5.42.

The difference between causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving and causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs is, quite obviously, the additional element of drink, drugs or failing to provide a specimen in relation to the latter offence.

Notwithstanding the fact that both offences require the driving to be careless, there are very different maximum sentences for each offence (5 years' and 14 years' imprisonment respectively), which reflect the increased culpability where drugs or alcohol are involved. Where this additional element can be proved, the section 3A offence should be charged rather than the section 2B offence.

In the same way that careless and inconsiderate driving are, in practice, 2 separate offences, causing death by careless driving and causing death by inconsiderate driving are two separate offences. Thus a single count or charge averring both would be bad for duplicity.

Mode of Trial

For the first time, prosecutors will have to make recommendations about mode of trial in cases where death is an element of the charge. The mode of trial decision in a causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving case is likely to be a sensitive issue, since what is said in court, possibly in front of bereaved relatives, will be seen as an indication of how serious a view we have taken of the circumstances of the case.

The SGC Guideline: 'Causing Death by Driving' applies to offences committed on or after 4 August 2008. The content is also reflected in the Magistrates' Sentencing Guidelines. The starting points for the either way offences are clearly described together with typical aggravating and mitigating factors.

In order to inform the representations on mode of trial, prosecutors should compare the circumstances of the particular case with which they are dealing with those in the Guideline.

The Guideline envisages some circumstances in which the magistrates' sentencing powers will be sufficient, so prosecutors will inevitably be advising that some cases are suitable for summary trial; familiarity with the detail in the Guideline is therefore necessary for both prosecuting advocates and reviewing lawyers. For the purpose of absolute clarity, prosecutors should make explicit reference at the mode of trial enquiry to relevant factors in the SGC Guideline.

The 5 general factors used to determine seriousness (see above) are: 

• Awareness of risk;
• Effect of alcohol or drugs;
• Inappropriate speed of vehicle;
• Seriously culpable behaviour of offender; and
• Victim.

For causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, the Guideline sets out three specific levels of seriousness. The starting point for each level is as follows:

• a medium level Community Order (with the order ranging from a low to high community order) where the driving arose from momentary inattention with no aggravating factors;
• 36 weeks' custody (with a range from a high level community order to 2 years' imprisonment) for driving falling between the first and third starting points; and
• 15 months' imprisonment (ranging from 36 weeks' to 3 years' imprisonment) for careless or inconsiderate driving falling not far short of dangerous driving.

Having established the starting point, prosecutors should consider any aggravating factors relevant to mode of trial, which increase the starting point, either within the given range, or which, in the extreme, take the case within the higher starting point. Examples of aggravating factors specific to this offence are: other offences committed at the same time; more than one person killed; serious injury to others, in addition to the death; irresponsible behaviour (failing to stop or falsely blaming a victim for the collision); and previous driving convictions. It is important to bear in mind that, whilst relevant to sentence, previous convictions are not currently relevant to mode of trial considerations.

Prosecutors should then consider any mitigating factors relevant to mode of trial, which decrease the sentence starting point. Examples in the Guideline of mitigating factors specific to this offence are: offender seriously injured; victim a close friend or relative; victim's or another's actions contributed to the offence; offender's lack of driving experience contributed significantly to the likelihood of the collision or death; and the driving was in response to a proven and genuine emergency (falling short of a defence).

Prosecutors should then be able to form a view as to whether the magistrates' sentencing powers are sufficient.

In summary, when considering mode of trial, prosecutors should consider which seriousness factors are present, and, having done so, decide into which of the three levels of seriousness the case falls, having regard to the sentencing range and relevant aggravating and mitigating factors present.

It is essential that mode of trial is fully considered by the reviewing lawyer at the point when a charging decision is reached and the reasons for reaching the decision are clearly and thoroughly recorded.

The mode of trial decision should be agreed and approved by the CCP and, where possible, the bereaved family should be advised of it, and the reasons for reaching the decision, well in advance of the hearing at which mode of trial will be considered.

Acceptance of pleas

With charges under section 2B, it will not normally be appropriate to accept a plea to an offence under section 3.

All decisions about accepting a plea to a lesser offence than section 2B should be approved by a CCP.

Inquests

Section 20(5) RSA amends section 16 of the Coroners Act 1988 to include causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving. The Coroner must adjourn an inquest where a person is charged with causing death by dangerous driving, causing death by careless driving or causing death by careless driving whilst under the influence of drink or drugs, unless there is a reason not to adjourn, until the outcome of the criminal proceedings. This includes summary trials of offences under section 2B.

Section 20(5) RSA does not apply to fatal collisions where section 3 careless driving has been charged because causation cannot be proved (rare though this should be). Such proceedings should continue to be adjourned until after the inquest (Smith v DPP [2000] R.T.R.36, R v Beresford (1952)116 JP Jo 194).

Where it is considered beneficial to do so, the reviewing lawyer should attend an inquest where the related criminal proceedings have still to be concluded.

Causing death by driving while unlicensed; uninsured or disqualified

The Law

(Archbold 32-63a) (Wilkinson 5.99)

Section 21 RSA creates new section 3ZB RTA as follows:

"A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he causes the death of another person by driving a motor vehicle on a road and, at the time when he is driving, the circumstances are such that he is committing an offence under -

section 87(1) of this Act (driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence),
section 103(1)(b) of this Act (driving while disqualified), or
section 143 of this Act (using motor vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against third party risks)."

It is an offence triable either way with a maximum sentence of 2 years' imprisonment and a minimum disqualification of 12 months.

The offence was brought into force on 18 August 2008 and is available for offences committed on or after that day.

Note that an offence under section 3ZB can only be committed on a road. Contrast this with section 143 RTA which can be committed: 'on a road or other public place'. Similarly, for section 3ZB, a person must be driving a motor vehicle, whereas for section 143 a person may also be using a motor vehicle.

The standard of driving is irrelevant; it need only be proved that someone's death was caused by virtue of the vehicle being driven on a road (without insurance etc.). 'Causing' in section 3ZB does not have the same meaning as causation in homicide or the other RTA offences. The defendant need not be culpable in any way for the death. The issue of "causation" arose R v John Jason Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 whereby the court considered (1) Was fault or another blameworthy act required; (2) was it sufficient that the appellant's driving was a cause of the death? The court stated the answer to the questions were clear. Blameworthy conduct was not necessary; it was sufficient that the driving was a cause.

Parliament has therefore decided that where a person has committed the mischief of driving, while at the same time being unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, and someone dies, that person is criminally liable for that death. So, in a case where a pedestrian runs out in front of a car and is killed by the car driver who could not have done anything to prevent the collision, provided that the driver was unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, the driver may be convicted of a section 3ZB offence.

In the normal course of events, where there is sufficient evidence for a section 3ZB offence, a prosecution for the full offence should follow; any consideration of culpability is for the court when deciding on sentence.

However, there may be exceptional circumstances where it is not in the public interest to prosecute. Paragraph 4.15 of the CPS Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Bad Driving gives an example of when it might not be in the public interest to prosecute under section 3ZB, namely where:

"the illegality arose as a result of a genuine mistake on the part of the driver, for example, a mistaken belief that he/she was insured... where the deceased was a close relative or friend".

In R v M H [2011] EWCA Crim 1508 the court considered whether a person commits the offence contrary to section 3ZB if his manner of driving is faultless and the death has nothing at all to do with the manner of his driving.

The court endorsed and confirmed the decision in R v Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 but made a veiled reference to the potential harshness of the legislation by stating at paragraph 47:

"Whether it is in the public interest to prosecute in these circumstances is a matter for the Director of public Prosecutions".

The principles from both cases is clear and whilst we cannot go behind the will of Parliament a prosecution may not be required in the public interest where circumstances as outlined in Paragraph 4.15 of the CPS Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Bad Driving exist.

Where there is evidence that the driving fell below the required standard, an appropriate offence incorporating dangerous or careless driving should be charged. An offence under section 3ZB may also properly be charged without it being duplicitous or oppressive because the offences deal with different aspects of the defendant's alleged criminality.

For reasons of consistency of approach, the Director has agreed that charging decisions in cases of causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured should be approved by a Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor.

Similarly, any decision as to mode of trial or to accept a plea to a lesser offence should also be approved by the DCCP.

Mode of Trial

As with causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, the mode of trial decision in a causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured case is a sensitive issue and will require great care.

Prosecutors should compare the circumstances of the particular case they are considering with those in the SGC Guideline: 'Causing Death by Driving' in order to ascertain the likely sentencing range the court would, in due course, be considering; this will inform the prosecution's representations on mode of trial. As summarised below, the range of sentences is quite extensive and straddles the maximum of 6 months' imprisonment sentencing power available to magistrates; familiarity with the detail in the Guideline is therefore necessary for both prosecuting advocates and reviewing lawyers.

For offences of causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, there are three specific levels of seriousness described in the Guideline. The starting point for each level is as follows: 

• where the offender was disqualified from driving or the offender was unlicensed or uninsured plus two or more aggravating factors from the list below the starting point is 12 months' imprisonment (with a range from 36 weeks' to 2 years' imprisonment); 
• where the offender was unlicensed or uninsured plus at least one aggravating factor from the list below, the starting point is 26 weeks' imprisonment (with a range from a high level Community order to 36 weeks' imprisonment);
• where the offender was unlicensed or uninsured with no aggravating factors the starting point is a medium Community order (with a range between a low and high Community order).

Having established the starting point, consider the aggravating factors, which increase the starting point, either within the given range or, in the extreme, take the case within the higher starting point. Examples of aggravating factors specific to this offence are: previous convictions for motoring offences, whether involving bad driving or involving an offence of the same kind that forms part of the present conviction (i.e. unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured driving); more than one person killed as a result of the offence; serious injury to one or more persons in addition to the death(s); or irresponsible behaviour such as failing to stop or falsely claiming that someone else was driving. Note that (until the introduction of the new allocation procedures, expected in 2009) previous convictions are relevant to sentence but not to mode of trial.

Then consider the mitigating factors, which decrease the starting point. Examples of mitigating factors specific to this offence are:

• the decision to drive was brought about by a proven and genuine emergency falling short of a defence;
• the offender genuinely believed that he or she was insured or licensed to drive;
• the offender was seriously injured as a result of the collision; or
• the victim was a close friend or relative.

As can be seen from the Guideline, causing death while driving whilst disqualified will almost inevitably be unsuitable for summary trial.

It is essential that mode of trial is fully considered by the reviewing lawyer at the point when a charging decision is reached and the reasons for reaching the decision are clearly and comprehensively recorded.

The decision should be agreed and approved by the CCP and, where possible, the bereaved family should be advised of the decision, and the reasons for reaching the decision, well in advance of the hearing at which mode of trial will be considered.

Acceptance of pleas

With a charge under section 3ZB, it will not normally be appropriate to accept a plea to an offence of driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence and/or while disqualified and/or uninsured. All decisions about accepting a plea to a lesser offence than section 2B should be approved by a CCP.

Dangerous Driving

The Law

Definition of dangerous driving (Archbold 32-27) (Wilkinson 5.03).

A person drives dangerously when the way his standard of driving falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver and it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be dangerous.

Both parts of the definition must be satisfied for the driving to be "dangerous" within the meaning of the Act. (Section 2A(1) RTA 1988).

There is no statutory definition of what is meant by "far below" but "dangerous must refer to danger of personal injury or of serious damage to property: (Section 2A(3) RTA 1988). Additionally, (Section 2A(2) RTA 1988) provides that a person is to regarded as driving dangerously if it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous. When considering the state of the vehicle, regard may be had to anything carried by or attached to the vehicle: (Section 2A(3) RTA 1988).

The standard of the driving is to be judged absolutely; age, experience, and disability are not relevant, except to sentence.

Dangerous driving is an either way offence carrying a level 5 fine and/or 6 months custody in the Magistrates Court; in the Crown Court the maximum penalty is 2 years' custody and/or an unlimited fine.

Wherever the case is heard, the Court must disqualify the driver from driving for at least a year and order an extended retest, unless "special reasons" are found for not disqualifying (in which case it must endorse the driver's licence with 3-11 penalty points unless there are, again, "special reasons " for not doing so).

Charging Practice

Dangerous driving includes situations where the driver has of his or her own free will adopted a particular way of driving, and also where there is a substantial error of judgement, that, even if only for a short time, amounts to driving falling far below the required standard. If the driving that caused danger was taken as a deliberate decision this would be an aggravating feature of the offence.

It is important to remember that the manner of the driving must be seen in the context of the surrounding circumstances in which the driving took place (e.g. amount of traffic, visibility). The circumstances of every case will be unique and must be considered in each case before reaching a decision as to the appropriate level of charge.

The test for "dangerousness" is an objective one; persistent disregard of, say, traffic directions (be they "stop", "give way" or traffic lights) may be evidence that the manner of the driving has fallen far below the standard required, thus making a charge of dangerous driving appropriate. It would be an aggravating feature of the offence if it could be proved that this was deliberate.

The following examples of circumstances that are likely to be characterised as dangerous driving are derived from decided cases and the SGC Guideline 'Causing Death by Driving' (http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/guidelines): 

• racing or competitive driving; 
• speed, which is particularly inappropriate for the prevailing road or traffic conditions; 
• aggressive driving, such as sudden lane changes, cutting into a line of vehicles or driving much too close to the vehicle in front; 
• disregard of traffic lights and other road signs, which, on an objective analysis, would appear to be deliberate; 
• disregard of warnings from fellow passengers; 
• overtaking which could not have been carried out safely; 
• driving when knowingly suffering from a medical or physical condition that significantly and dangerously impairs the offender's driving skills such as having an arm or leg in plaster, or impaired eyesight. It can include the failure to take prescribed medication; 
• driving when knowingly deprived of adequate sleep or rest; 
• driving a vehicle knowing it has a dangerous defect or is poorly maintained or is dangerously loaded; 
• using a hand-held mobile phone or other hand-held electronic equipment whether as a phone or to compose or read text messages when the driver was avoidably and dangerously distracted by that use; 
• driving whilst avoidably and dangerously distracted such as whilst reading a newspaper/map, talking to and looking at a passenger, selecting and lighting a cigarette or by adjusting the controls of electronic equipment such as a radio, hands-free mobile phone or satellite navigation equipment; 
• failing to have a proper and safe regard for vulnerable road users such as cyclists, motorcyclists, horse riders, the elderly and pedestrians or in the vicinity of a pedestrian crossing, hospital, school or residential home; and 
• a brief but obvious danger arising from a seriously dangerous manoeuvre. This covers situations where a driver has made a mistake or an error of judgement that was so substantial that it caused the driving to be dangerous even for only a short time. (Cases that illustrate this principle include: Att.Gen's Reference No 32 of 2001 (2002) 1 Cr.App.R. (S) 121 (offender failed to stop at a junction where there was a give way sign, failing to see a taxi that was being driven across the junction perfectly properly and colliding with it); Att.Gen's Reference No 4 of 2000 [2000]) EWCA Crim 780 (offender unintentionally pressed the accelerator instead of the brake); and Att.Gen's Reference No.76 of 2002 (Hodges) (2003) 1 Cr.App.R. (S) 100 (offender drove across junction marked by a give way sign and collided with a car that was being driven along the major road, and had no explanation for his failure to see the car - "This was a single misjudgement. It was a bad misjudgement but nevertheless a single one" (p.423)).

It is not necessary to consider what the driver thought about the possible consequences of his actions: simply whether or not a competent and careful driver would have observed, appreciated and guarded against obvious and material dangers.

In the case of a vehicle in such a state of disrepair as to be dangerous, consideration should be given to whether the vehicle should have been driven at all, as well as to how it was driven in the particular circumstances.

Careless/inconsiderate driving

This offence is committed when the defendant's driving falls below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver (section 3ZA RTA). In determining what is to be expected of a competent and careful driver the prosecutor must take into account not only the circumstances of which the driver could be expected to be aware, but also any circumstances shown to have been within the driver's knowledge.

The test of whether the standard of driving has fallen below the required standard is objective. It applies both when the manner of driving in question is deliberate and when it occurs as a result of incompetence, inadvertence or inexperience.

The maximum penalty is a level 5 fine. The court must also either endorse the driver's licence with between 3 and 9 penalty points (unless there are 'special reasons' not to do so), or impose disqualification for a fixed period and/or until a driving test has been passed.

Occasionally a collision occurs but there is no evidence of any mechanical defect, illness of the driver or other explanation to account for why the Collision happened. In these cases, a charge of careless driving may be appropriate, but you should exercise caution.

If you can prove how an incident occurred (e.g. a collision) the case can be put on the basis that there is a very strong inference that the defendant was driving below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver. In the absence of any explanation by the defendant as to the cause of the collision, a court may infer that the offence was committed, but where the defendant does provide an explanation for the collision, however unlikely, you will have to consider whether to proceed.

The civil law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur [the thing speaks for itself] has no direct application to the criminal law (but see Wilkinson at 5.50). In the absence of any explanation by the defendant, if the only conclusion which is possible to draw is that the defendant was negligent or had departed from what a reasonably prudent and confident driver would have done in the circumstances, a court should convict").

In some cases, particularly where there has been a collision, the evidence will show that more than one driver was at fault. It will be necessary to establish that there is evidence from an independent source against any driver who is to be charged, but the possibility of charging more than one driver remains if both have failed to comply with the statutory standard.

There are decided cases that provide some guidance as to the driving that courts will regard as careless or inconsiderate and the following examples are typical of what we are likely to regard as careless driving: 

• overtaking on the inside;
• driving inappropriately close to another vehicle;
• inadvertently driving through a red light;
• emerging from a side road into the path of another vehicle;
• tuning a car radio;
• using a hand-held mobile phone or other hand-held electronic equipment when the driver was avoidably distracted by that use; and 
• selecting and lighting a cigarette or similar when the driver was avoidably distracted by that use.

These examples are merely indicative of what can amount to careless driving. Note that some of these examples also fall within the examples of dangerous driving. It is necessary to put the facts into context, decide the degree to which the standard of driving fell below that required, and consider whether the particular facts of the case warrant a charge of careless or dangerous driving.

You should also consider whether a driver has failed to observe a provision of the Highway Code. This does not itself render that person liable to criminal proceedings, but a failure, particularly a serious one, may constitute evidence of careless or even dangerous driving (Section 38(7) RTA 1988).

In cases where there is an overlap between careless driving and some other offences such as driving with excess alcohol, a regulatory offence, an offence of strict liability, or a 'Construction and Use' offence, the merits of the individual case may often be adequately met by charging the specific statutory or regulatory offence.

In such cases prosecutors should decide whether a separate charge of driving without due care and attention adds anything to the case, and whether any additional penalty is likely to result on conviction, before deciding to charge this offence as well.

Public interest considerations

When considering the public interest test you should look at the degree of blameworthiness: the greater the blameworthiness, the greater the public interest in favour of prosecution.

There are specific reasons to proceed where the defendant has not passed a driving test, particularly where he/she is unfit to drive because of a disability or is driving otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of a provisional licence.

The courts have power to disqualify a driver until he passes a driving test, and where the defendant may be unfit to continue to drive, the court has power to notify the Secretary of State about any relevant disability.

Conversely, the public interest does not call for a prosecution in every case where there is, evidentially, a realistic prospect of conviction for careless driving. A prosecution should not be commenced because of technical lapse from the statutory standard where a case is likely to attract only a nominal penalty and will have no deterrent effect on a defendant or other motorists.

It will not necessarily be appropriate to prosecute in every case where a minor collision occurs. What matters is the extent of the error, not the extent of any damage. It is not the function of the prosecution [or the criminal courts] to conduct proceedings in order to settle questions of liability for the benefit of individual motorists or insurance companies. Therefore the public interest will tend to be against a prosecution for careless driving where the incident is of a type such as frequently occurs at parking places or in traffic queues, involving minimal carelessness.

Driving without reasonable consideration - Section 3 RTA 1988

The Law

The definition of this offence is set out in section 3ZA of the Road Safety Act 2006. A driver can be guilty of driving without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by his driving (section 3ZA (3)).The penalties are the same as for driving without due care and attention.

Generally, prosecutors prefer 'Careless Driving"' to "Driving without due consideration" as the former is easier to prove - there is no need to show that an actual road user is inconvenienced, etc. But 'due consideration' is more appropriate where the real harm done is aimed at, or suffered by a particular person.

Note the essential difference between the two offences under section 3 RTA 1988 is that in cases of careless driving the prosecution need not show that any other person was inconvenienced. In cases of inconsiderate driving, there must be evidence that some other user of the road or public place was actually inconvenienced.

This offence is appropriate when the driving amounts to a clear act of incompetence, selfishness, impatience or aggressiveness. There must, however, also be some inconvenience to other road users, for example, forcing other drivers to move over and/or brake as a consequence. The following examples are typical of what we are likely to regard as inconsiderate driving:

• flashing of lights to force other drivers in front to give way;
• misuse of any lane to avoid queuing or gain some other advantage over other drivers; 
• unnecessarily remaining in an overtaking lane;
• unnecessarily slow driving or braking without good cause;
• driving with un-dipped headlights which dazzle oncoming drivers;
• driving through a puddle causing pedestrians to be splashed; and
• driving a bus in such a way as to alarm passengers.

Note that you must decide which version of the offence to charge as the section creates two separate offences and there is no alternative verdict provision in the Magistrates/Youth court (R v Surrey Justices, ex parte Witherick [1932] 1 K.B. 340).

Public interest considerations

The public interest considerations for this offence are largely the same. You may be more inclined to prosecute where you have decided that due consideration is the appropriate charge and you will be calling evidence to show that the defendant caused harm, annoyance or distress (e.g. the example regarding the pedestrians and the puddle - see above).

Wanton and Furious Driving

The Law

Definition of wanton or furious driving (Archbold - 19-248a) (Wilkinson 5.101).

It is an offence for anyone: 

• to be in charge of a vehicle, and 
• to cause or cause to be done bodily harm to any person; 
• by wanton or furious driving, racing or 
• other wilful misconduct, or 
• by wilful neglect.

It is an offence triable only on indictment (except when committed by a youth).

The offence carries a maximum penalty of a 2 years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. Penalty points and discretionary disqualification are now available to courts via section 28 Road Safety Act 2006.

The offence can only be committed if the driver has a degree of subjective recklessness so far as the foreseeabilty of causing injury is concerned. In other words, he must appreciate that harm was possible or probable as a result of the bad driving (see R v Okosi [1996] CLR 666).

Charging Practice

We should only prosecute for this offence when it is not possible to prosecute for an offence under the road traffic legislation, for example: 

• when the driving was not on a road or other public place;
• when the vehicle used was not a mechanically propelled vehicle (such as a bicycle or horse drawn vehicle); or
• when a Notice of Intended Prosecution has not been given.

When a vehicle has been deliberately used as a weapon and has caused injury we will normally prosecute for the offence of dangerous driving or a specific assault under other provisions in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, subject to there being sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, for one of those offences.

Taking a Conveyance without Authority, contrary to section 12 of the 1968 Act (Archbold 21-141)

This offence is committed when a person takes a conveyance without the owner's consent or other lawful authority for his own or another's use, or, knowing that any conveyance has been taken without such authority, drives it or allows himself to be carried in it or on it.

It is a summary offence, which carries a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months and/or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale and discretionary disqualification from driving. Note that as a result of section 37 Vehicle (Crime) Act 2001 (Archbold 21-141), section 12(3A) now provides that when there is a certificate setting out the date on which sufficient evidence came to the knowledge of the person responsible for commencing the prosecution, proceedings should be commenced within 6 months from the date specified, but that no proceedings may be brought after three years from the date of the taking of the motor vehicle.

In addition a charge of taking a conveyance without consent is one of the specified offences for the purposes of section 30 Criminal Justice Act 1988. As a result in appropriate cases such offences can be placed as a Count on the indictment e.g. where a vehicle has been taken to facilitate the main offence.

Prosecutors should also note that a jury is able to bring an alternative verdict convicting an offender of Taking without owner's consent as an alternative to a count alleging theft of the conveyance (Archbold 21-145).

The taking of a pedal cycle or the riding of pedal cycle, knowing it to have been taken without the owner's consent, is not within the provisions of section 12(1) of the 1968 Act, but is covered by section 12(4) of the 1968 Act - the penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

The elements of the offence are:

Taking
There must be some element, but more than mere movement - the vehicle should be used as a conveyance.

A conveyance
This means a conveyance constructed or adapted for the carriage of a person or persons whether by land, water or air. It does not include a conveyance constructed or adapted for use only under the control of a person not carried in or on it.

Without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority
Section 12(7) of the 1968 Act provides that when a vehicle which has been taken is the subject of a hiring agreement or a hire purchase agreement, a person in the possession of the vehicle under such an agreement is deemed to be the owner for the purposes of section 12.

Knowing that such a conveyance has been taken without consent drives it or allows himself to be carried in it or on it.
Note that this requires knowledge that the vehicle has been taken and the accused has either driven the vehicle or been a passenger.

Statutory Defence

Section 12(6) of the 1968 Act provides that a person does not commit an offence under section 12 by anything done in the belief that he has the lawful authority to do it or that he would have the owner's consent if the owner knew of his doing it and the circumstances of it.

Examples of when it would be appropriate to charge this offence are: 

• when an accused takes a conveyance and then later abandons it; 
• when a motor vehicle is legitimately borrowed for a particular purpose and is used thereafter for a wholly different purpose - for example, when the accused is given the use of his employer's vehicle to drive from London to Cardiff on business but decides to visit friends in Liverpool instead; 
• when a vehicle has been stolen or taken without the owner's consent by one person, abandoned and subsequently taken without consent by another person; 
• when the evidence is not clear as to whether a driver or passenger was a party to the taking of the vehicle, you should consider whether to charge the offence of driving it or allowing oneself to be carried, provided that the necessary evidence is available to show that the person knew that it has been previously taken without the owner's consent; and
• when a victim has been forcibly deprived of his vehicle, but there is insufficient evidence to support robbery, because an intention to permanently deprive cannot be proved.

Examples of when it is not appropriate to charge this offence are:

• When there is a minor deviation from a proper route by a person who has an otherwise authorised used of the vehicle;
• When a vehicle has been moved only a short distance because it was causing an obstruction; 
• When consent to the taking was obtained by fraud, for example, by providing false particulars at the time of the hiring of a motor vehicle. In these circumstances, you should consider whether an offence under the provisions of the Fraud Act 2006 is more appropriate.

Other Charging Considerations

When there are any evidential difficulties in proving an offence under section 12 of the 1968 Act, you should consider charging an offence of vehicle interference contrary to section 9 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.

Where there is fingerprint or DNA evidence you need to consider carefully where this is located on the vehicle. You cannot assume, for example, that a fingerprint on an outside wing mirror is evidence of taking a motor vehicle. However, traces of blood on the ignition barrel will be different.

Taking a motor vehicle where force is used may amount to robbery, when the evidence supports the inference that the offender did not intend the victim to recover the car intact (for example, the car is not recovered, or is recovered but seriously damaged or burnt out).

Attempt

Section 12 of the 1968 Act is a summary only offence. There is no longer an offence of attempting to commit a summary offence and thus no offence of attempting to commit an offence under section 12 of the 1968 Act. Actions by an accused, which fall short of the full offence under this section, are likely to be covered by a charge of vehicle interference.

Aggravated Vehicle Taking, contrary to section 12A of the Theft Act 1968 (Archbold 21-158)

The offence of aggravated vehicle taking is committed if a person commits an offence under section 12(1) of the 1968 Act in relation to a mechanically propelled vehicle and it is proved that at any time after the vehicle was unlawfully taken (whether by that person or another) and before it was recovered, the vehicle was driven, or death, injury or damage was caused, in one or more the circumstances set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 12A(2):

• that the vehicle was driven dangerously on a road or other public place;
• that, owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which injury was caused to any person;
• that, owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which damage was caused to any property, other than the vehicle; and 
• that damage was caused to the vehicle.

Aggravated vehicle taking is an either-way offence which carries a penalty on conviction on indictment of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or, if in the circumstances of section 12A(2)(b) above, an accident results in the death of another, then a person guilty of the offence shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 13 years, (by virtue of Criminal Justice Act 2003). On summary conviction, it carries a penalty of imprisonment for up to 6 months and/or a fine of up to the statutory maximum.

When the only aggravated element of an offence under section 12A is the allegation of damage being caused to the vehicle and/or other property, the offence will be triable summarily only, if the value of the damage does not exceed the relevant sum under section 22 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (Archbold 1-75i).

Offences under section 12A of the 1968 Act are subject to obligatory disqualification (for a minimum period of 12 months) and endorsement of the offender's driving licence with 3 to 11 penalty points when, for special reasons, disqualification is not imposed.

Charging Considerations

Since the pre-requisite for an offence under this section is that the accused must have committed the basic offence of taking the vehicle without the owner's consent, you should apply the guidance set out above. If there is a realistic prospect of conviction on the evidence for an offence under section 12(1) then you should consider whether any of the additional circumstances referred to in section 12A(2) of the 1968 Act exist which would make it appropriate for the aggravated form of vehicle taking to be charged.

In cases involving a collision and damage or injury, prosecutors should be aware that it is not a requirement to show that the standard of driving is at fault. What is required to be established is a causal connection between the driving of the vehicle and the occurrence of the accident from which the damage or injury results (R v Marsh 1997 1 Cr. App. R 67).

Where the manner of driving falls far below the standard required the driver you should normally charge dangerous driving, because on conviction for that offence the court has power to order the driver to take a re-test before driving again, a power which is not available on conviction for this offence.

Where there is evidence of dangerous driving leading to a fatal collision you should normally charge the driver with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving, so that the sentencing court has power to order the driver to take an extended driving test before driving again. This power is not available for this offence.

Where there is no evidence that the manner of driving fell below the standard required, but there is evidence that the vehicle has been taken without consent, you should charge this offence where there has been a collision as a result of which, either personal injury or damage to property other than the vehicle, have been caused. This offence should also be used where damage has been caused to the vehicle.

It should be appreciated that a person who either takes a vehicle without authority or allows himself to be carried in it may commit the aggravated offence if the vehicle is driven or damaged by someone else so as to come within the specified circumstances as set out in section 12A Theft Act 1968. In this respect prosecutors should be aware of the two statutory defences in section 12A(3).

Section 12A of the 1968 Act creates 2 offences, one with a maximum penalty of 2 years' imprisonment on indictment and the second when the additional facts under section 12A(2)(b) are proved and death results with a maximum penalty of 13 years' imprisonment. A sentence of 13 years' is only available to a judge if the indictment alleges that a death occurred. Thus any charge and any indictment must make it clear which of the 2 offences is being charged (R v Sherwood; R v Button [1994] RTR 60).

If the evidence is that a vehicle has been taken by the use of force or threat of force, but there is insufficient evidence to prove an intention to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle, it may be appropriate to charge aggravated vehicle taking or blackmail.

Public interest considerations

Prosecutors should bear in mind that unauthorised takings of motor vehicles causes distress and can result in great inconvenience to those relying on that vehicle e.g. the owner and his/her family. It follows that, in the absence of clear reasons to the contrary, a prosecution should normally follow a decision that sufficient evidence exists to support the evidential test in respect of basic offences under section 12(1) Theft Act 1968.

In the case of aggravated offences it is more likely that the public interest will require a prosecution because of the serious nature of such offences in terms of risk to other road users and to the general public.

Where one or more defendant is being carried in a conveyance it is necessary to establish each knew that the vehicle had been taken without authority. For this reason, it is best practice to charge each occupant of the vehicle separately.

Alternative verdicts

The 1968 Act also provides for alternative verdicts in two circumstances:

• Offence Charged: Theft of a motor car - section 1. Alternative verdict: Taking without the owner's consent - section 12
• Offence Charged: Aggravated vehicle taking - section 12 (a). Alternative verdict: Taking without the owner's consent - section 12.

Unlawful wounding/inflicting grievous bodily harm

Offences contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Refer to (Archbold 19-200) for the law.

The offence is committed when a person unlawfully and maliciously, either: 

• wounds another person; or 
• inflicts grievous bodily harm upon another person.

It is an either way offence, which carries a maximum penalty on indictment of 5 years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. Summarily, the maximum penalty is 6 months' imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.

There has been recent debate on whether a charge under OAPA should be preferred when someone is seriously injured as a result of dangerous driving. We believe prosecutors should consider a section 20 or section 18 OAPA charge where there is sufficient evidence and whether it is appropriate to do so having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

In R v Bain [2005] EWCA Crim 7 the court stated that there was nothing wrong in principle, and there was no abuse involved, in charging dangerous driving and inflicting grievous bodily harm in relation to the same incident. However the court did state that the dangerous driving was the underlying act.

The prosecution must prove under section 20 that either the defendant intended, or actually foresaw, that the act might cause some harm, albeit of a minor character (R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1992] 1 A.C 699). It is not necessary to prove that the defendant either intended or foresaw that his action might cause serious harm. It is enough that the defendant foresaw some physical harm to some person (i.e. not necessarily the person suffering the injury, and not necessarily a person of whom the defendant is aware). Of course, if there is sufficient evidence to prove an intention to cause serious harm, the appropriate charge will be section 18.

Examples of successful prosecutions include the following: 

Chambers (13/GA/0302908): dangerous driving involving police pursuit where the defendant drove at speed and ignored red traffic lights- collision with oncoming vehicle causing serious injury to both its two occupants. Following guilty pleas to dangerous driving and 2 section 20 offences, the defendant was sentenced at Bradford Crown Court on 22 June 2009 to 3 years' imprisonment;

Hart (47WW0095108): driving at speeds of at least 55mph in residential roads (30mph limit); fails to give way (or even slow down) at 3 junctions; at third junction, the offender collides with a cyclist and 3 pedestrians - 3 suffer serious injury. Charged with dangerous driving and three section 20 offences. Sentence: 3 years' imprisonment.

It follows that prosecutors should consider charges under OAPA as appropriate and within the principles of the Code where serious injury results from dangerous driving and the court's sentencing powers for dangerous driving may be inadequate. Consideration of a section 20 would clearly have the benefit of increasing the sentence to 5 years.

General factors to be taken into consideration

Road Conditions

Driving that may simply fall below the standard to be expected of a competent and careful driver in certain conditions may fall far below the required standard in other conditions and become dangerous. For example, there may be evidence of poor visibility, adverse weather conditions or difficult geography, such as a blind corner.

Speed

Evidence of excess speed is another example of this. Where there is evidence of grossly excessive speed, or speed which, although not grossly excessive, is dangerous as a result of the prevailing road conditions, a charge of dangerous driving may be appropriate. Each case will be reviewed according to is own particular facts.

The Highway Code

Many of these situations are considered in the Highway Code. Whilst it is not an offence to contravene a provision of the Highway Code, prosecutors should always consider evidence of any infringement, and its consequences, when deciding the appropriate level of charge.

Mobile Phones and Hand-held Devices

The responses to the CPS public consultation on bad driving have shown how seriously society views the potential dangers of the use of mobile phones and other hand-held devices, whilst driving. In cases where there is clear evidence that the driver has been avoidably and dangerously distracted as a result of the use of these devices while driving, a charge of dangerous driving should be the starting point for the charging decision.

Danger to Pedestrians and Cyclists

The responses to the consultation have also shown that there are public concerns about the dangers that can be caused to pedestrians and cyclists by bad driving. Important examples of these concerns include: 

• driving too close to cyclists;
• overtaking and cutting in front of cyclists;
• failure to observe cyclists and pedestrians at junctions; and 
• driving at speed in areas where pedestrians and cyclists are present, for example beside schools and built-up areas where children and others are present.

Further guidance about vulnerable road users can be found in paragraphs 204 - 225 of the revised Highway Code, referred to in paragraph 5.3 above.

Prosecutors should ensure that these concerns and the provisions of the revised Highway Code are fully considered when making their charging decisions and in the information presented to the court, where it is appropriate to do so.

Offences involving Corporate Bodies

You should ensure that cases involving bad driving in the workplace are reviewed not only to establish whether the driver should be prosecuted for any offence or offences, but also to determine whether there is evidence to show that an offence or offences have been committed by the driver's employer.

The CPS has a protocol with the Health and Safety Executive, the Local Government Association and the police for the investigation and prosecution of work related deaths and you should ensure that there is early liaison in appropriate cases where such a death has been caused as a result of bad driving. 'Work-Related Deaths: A Protocol for Liaison' is available elsewhere in this guidance or at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/agencies/wrdprotocol.html

Inquests

Section 16 of the Coroners Act 1988 now includes sections 2B (causing death by careless driving) and 3ZB (causing death whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured). The Coroner must adjourn an inquest where a person is charged with: causing death by dangerous driving; causing death by careless driving; causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured; or causing death by careless driving whilst under the influence of drink or drugs; unless there is a reason not to adjourn, until the outcome of the criminal proceedings. This includes summary trials of offences under section 2B and 3ZB.

The criminal proceedings will usually, therefore, be completed before the inquest, unless it is a fatal careless driving offence charged under section 3, in which case the summary trial should be adjourned until after the inquest. Such cases should now be rare, arising only where causation for section 2B cannot be proved.

Where it is considered beneficial to do so, the reviewing lawyer should attend an inquest where the related criminal proceedings have still to be concluded.

Bail

In bad driving cases, where there is a risk of the defendant committing a further bad driving offence on bail, you should give careful consideration to asking the court to impose conditions on bail or remand the defendant in custody, where there are grounds under the Bail Act to do so and you are satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

In a bad driving case the most appropriate condition would be for the defendant not to drive any motor vehicles.

Alternative verdicts - (Archbold 4-453)

Section 24 of RTOA 1988 allows for the return of alternative verdicts where the allegations in the indictment amount to, or include an allegation of an offence specified in the table set out in that section. The section applies to magistrates courts as well as to juries, provided the magistrates' court has jurisdiction to try the "Offence charged". The alternatives are set out below.

Offence Charged

Manslaughter

Alternative Verdicts

Section 1: causing death by dangerous driving
Section 2: dangerous driving
Section 3A: causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs
Section 35 OAPA: wanton & furious driving

 

Offence Charged

Section 1: death by dangerous driving

Alternative Verdicts

Section 2: dangerous driving
Section 2B causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving
Section 3: careless or inconsiderate driving

 

Offence Charged

Section 2: dangerous driving

Alternative Verdicts

Section 3: careless or inconsiderate driving

 

Offence Charged

Section 2B causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving

Alternative Verdicts

Section 3: careless or inconsiderate driving

 

Offence Charged

Section 3A: causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs

Alternative Verdicts

Section 3: careless or inconsiderate driving
and/or the relevant offence from;
Section 4(1): driving whilst unfit
Section 5(1)(a): driving with excess alcohol
Section 7(6): failing to provide a specimen
Section 7A(6): failing to give permission for laboratory test.

Where the accused is charged with an offence under section 3A RTA 1988 he may not be convicted as an alternative with any offence of attempting to drive: Section 24(2) RTOA 1988.

The provisions of Section 33 of the Road Safety Act 2006 now allow a jury to return an alternative verdict to a charge of manslaughter for one of four offences, including causing death by dangerous driving, if they do not find that there is sufficient evidence to convict of manslaughter but think the evidence was sufficient to prove any of those four offences. In addition to causing death by dangerous driving the 3 other offences are dangerous driving, causing death by careless driving whilst under the influence of drink or drugs and furious driving.

It is essential that the charge, which is the most appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, is always preferred. It will never be appropriate to charge a more serious offence in order to obtain a conviction (whether by plea or verdict) to a lesser offence.

Victim and Witness Care

One of our strategic aims is to champion justice and the rights of victims. Only by doing so will we inspire confidence in the communities that we serve.

This commitment applies to all of our work dealing with bad driving, but nowhere more so than in our treatment of victims, their families, friends and witnesses, in cases, where a fatality has occurred or serious injury has been caused.

There are now a number of procedures that prosecutors must follow to achieve this.

Direct Communication with Victims

Where a decision is taken to discontinue a case or substantially alter a charge, we write to all victims to explain this. In cases where there has been a death we offer a meeting to explain the decision. These commitments now form part of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

The Prosecutor's Pledge

In October 2004, the CPS issued the Prosecutor's Pledge. This is the CPS Public Policy Statement on the Treatment of Victims and Witnesses and sets out ten service standards that victims and witnesses can expect to receive from our prosecutors and should be applied in all bad driving cases.

The Victim Focus Scheme

We now provide an enhanced service to those who have lost a close family member in certain fatal bad driving cases, as set out in the Victim Focus Scheme - see http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/focus_scheme.html.

At an appropriate time after charge we write to the family via the police family liaison officer (FLO) offering a meeting and enclosing a leaflet explaining the Victim Focus scheme. This includes an offer of a meeting with the reviewing lawyer.

The FLO will provide the family with the leaflet and will outline the VF scheme to the appropriate family member. The FLO will find out whether the family wish to meet the reviewing lawyer.

Where the family does not wish to meet the prosecutor this does not does not preclude the family from requesting a meeting at a later stage.

The exact timing of the meeting will vary from case to case. Ideally it will take place after service of the case and before the PCMH. The reviewing lawyer should have had an opportunity to review the full file so that he/she fully understands the case before the meeting takes place.

However, undue delay should be avoided, as one of the purposes of the meeting is to deal with concerns that the family has about the process and instill confidence in the family that the reviewing lawyer is in charge of the case and is dealing with it in a competent and professional manner.

The meeting will normally take place post charge, but it may take place before charge in cases where the suspect is on bail pending a charging decision being reached. For example, if a meeting is being held to explain a prosecution decision then it may be desirable to explain the next steps in the process at that stage if it is practicable and appropriate to do so.

Where families request a further meeting, such a meeting should normally be held, unless there are good grounds to refuse.

At the meeting the reviewing lawyer will explain to the family the role of the CPS and the legal basis of the charges on which the prosecution is proceeding. The reviewing lawyer will also outline the court process, progress of the case and explain the Victim Personal Statement scheme and deal with questions that the family may have.

The purpose of the meeting is not to discuss the detail of the evidence in the case and this should have been made clear to the family in advance of the meeting in correspondence.

However, it must be recognised that families are still likely to ask questions pertaining to evidential or legal issues. Should evidential issues arise, the reviewing lawyer should have regard to risks of prejudicing proceedings when considering how to deal with such issues. Some family members may be witnesses and this may substantially limit how much can be said in relation to the evidence.

Terminology

One of the most significant themes that emerged from the responses to the CPS public consultation was the distress that is caused to victims and their families when cases of bad driving, where there has been a collision leading to death or serious injury, are referred to as 'accidents'. We have undertaken not to use this term. All CPS staff must, therefore, ensure that the term 'collision' is used in all such cases in correspondence, conversation, at court and in all meetings.

Meeting Victims and Families at Court

Where possible in cases where there has been a fatality as a result of bad driving, the reviewing lawyer should attend court to meet the bereaved family and will conduct the prosecution where it is possible to do so. Where the reviewing lawyer is not the advocate, the advocate will meet the bereaved family as well.

With either way offences, as part of the process of explaining what will happen, advocates should inform the family of what representations they will be making in respect of mode of trial (if this has not already been discussed at a VF meeting).

Accepting pleas

In some cases you may consider accepting a guilty plea from the defendant to a different charge or where the defendant indicates a guilty plea on the basis of certain specified facts.

The Code for Crown Prosecutors requires us to take into account the interests and views of the victim or the bereaved family when we decide whether any such plea should be accepted.

Although the decision rests with the CPS, you should consult the victim or the bereaved family in accordance with the Victim's Code, the Prosecutor's Pledge and the Victim Focus Scheme, before that decision is made.

You should also follow the Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas and the Prosecutor's Role in Sentencing (the Guidelines) issued in October 2005 by the Attorney General. These emphasise that it is our role to protect the interests of the victim. They also state that save in the most exceptional circumstances, the acceptance of pleas should be conducted in open court so that we can explain our reasons for accepting pleas in public.

The guidelines make it clear that we should only accept the plea if we think that the court is able to pass a sentence that matches the seriousness of the offending.

For offences of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving and causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, any decision to accept a plea to a lesser offence must be approved by a CCP (or equivalent).

Sentencing

Note that whilst offences under sections 1 and 3A RTA are specified offences for the purposes of the dangerous offender provisions, sections 2B and 3ZB are not.

You should make sure that the court has all the information it needs to sentence appropriately. This will include any relevant information contained in a victim personal statement.

Where there is to be a delay between the date of conviction and the date on which the court will pass sentence, the prosecution advocate must remind the court of its power to impose an interim disqualification on a defendant where it is lawful for the court to do so.

The prosecution advocate should correct any misleading information given by the defence and consider carefully any sentence that is passed to make sure that it reflects the crime.

The prosecution advocate should always be prepared to assist the sentencing court with references to current case law and any guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, in particular the definitive Guideline: 'Causing Death by Driving' (http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/index.html).

Further guidance is also available in the CPS Sentencing Manual available via http://infonet.cps.gov.uk/infonet/local2me/National/bdd/OperationalLegalSupportDivision/xml_013673.