Harassment: Protection from Harassment Act 1997
This Guidance was confirmed up to date 7 July 2009
- The Law
- Elements of Offences
- Offence of Harassment - Section 2
- Putting People in Fear of Violence - Section 4
- Racial and Religious Aggravation
- Breach of Order
- Defence - Offence of Harassment - Section 2
- Defence - Putting People in Fear of Violence - Section 4
- Defence to Breach of Criminal or Civil Order
- Examples of Use of Defences
- Secretary of State's Certificate - Section 12
- Timing
- Charging Practice
- Procedure - Pre-Trial
- Procedure - Post-Trial
- Annex A - Home Office Circular 34/1997 Protection from Harassment Act 1997
- Annex B - Home Office Circular 34/2005 Sections 125, 126 and 127 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
The Law
Protection from Harassment Act 1997
Main Features of the Act
Refer also to Home Office Circular 34/1997 and Home Office Circular 34/2005 below in this section
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 introduces four new criminal offences. Archbold: 19-277a
- Harassment (section 2): summary only, six months' imprisonment and/or a level 5 fine;
- fear of violence (section 4); either way, five years' imprisonment and/or a fine on indictment; as above summarily;
- breach of civil injunction section 3(6); either way, same penalty as s.4 offence;
- breach of restraining order section 5(5); either way, same penalty as s.4;
- a new civil tort of harassment is created by section 3.
All of the offences are arrestable; s.2 under s24(2) of PACE, which is amended by s.2(3) of the Act; the remaining offences by virtue of their five year maximum penalty.
Under section 5, the Crown Court and the magistrates' court can make a restraining order on conviction, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order, for the purpose of protecting the victim from further harassment or fear of violence. This is one of the major benefits of the Act; see Restraining Orders, below in this section.
Elements of Offences
Offence of Harassment - Section 2
Archbold: 19-277b
The elements of the section 2 offence are:
Section 1(1)
- a course of conduct;
- which amounts to harassment of another;
- which the defendant knows, or ought to know amounts to harassment of another.
or Section 1(1A) [as inserted by SOCPA 2005, s. 125(2)]
- a course of conduct;
- which involves harassment of two or more persons;
- which the defendant knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons;
- by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not one of those mentioned above):
- i) not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or
ii) to do something that he is not under any obligation to do.
The defendant ought to know if his course of conduct amounts to harassment if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.
Section 7 (Archbold: 19-277g) defines a course of conduct as involving conduct on at least two occasions.
Harassment is not defined, but includes causing alarm or distress, and conduct is defined as including speech.
Section 7(3)A provides that:
- Conduct by one person shall also be taken to be conduct by another if that other has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the conduct.
- The knowledge and purpose of the person who aids, abets, counsels or procures conduct are what was contemplated or reasonably foreseeable at the time of the aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring and not when the conduct occurs.
The amendment at (a) above makes it clear that a campaign of collective harassment by 2 or more people can amount to a "course of conduct". It also confirms that one person can pursue a course of conduct by committing one act personally and arranging for another person to commit another act.
The amendment at (b) above ensures that the knowledge and purpose of the person who aids, abets, counsels or procures conduct is judged at the time that the conduct was planned and not when it is carried out. This may assist a defendant to offer a defence of reasonableness if, at the time that he commissioned a subsequent act, he was unaware that the first act had caused distress to the complainant. Such a defence would not succeed if the defendant ought to have known that the act would cause distress at the time that the subsequent act was commissioned.
This section extends the definition of "conduct" and "course of conduct" for the purposes of sections 1 to 5 of the Act. It was inserted by section 44 Criminal Justice Act 2001 and came into force on 1 August 2001.
Putting People in Fear of Violence: section 4
Archbold: 19-277e
The elements of the section 4 offence are:
- a course of conduct
- which causes another to fear that violence will be used against him
- which the defendant knows or ought to know will cause another to fear that violence will be used against him.
The defendant ought to know that his course of conduct will cause another to fear that violence will be used against them if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think that the course of conduct would cause the other so to fear on that occasion.
Racial and Religious Aggravation
Archbold: 19-277j
Section 32 (1)(a) Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a racially or religiously aggravated form of section 2 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (offence of harassment).
Section 32 (1)(b) Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a racially or religiously aggravated form of section 4 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (putting people in fear of violence).
Refer to Racist and Religious Crime, elsewhere in this Guidance
Breach of Order
Sections 3(6) and 5(5) make it an offence for the defendant to do anything which he is prohibited from doing under an injunction issued under s.3, or a restraining order issued under s.5.
It should be noted that whereas the s.2 and 4 offences require a course of conduct, breaches of court orders require only a single act.
Defence - Offence of Harassment - section 2
Archbold: 19-277b
Three defences are available under s.2:
- that the course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime;
- that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or
- that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.
The defendant ought to know that his course of conduct will cause another to fear that violence will be used against them if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think that the course of conduct would cause the other so to fear on that occasion.
Defence - Putting People in Fear of Violence - section 4
Archbold: 19-277e
Under s.4 the following statutory defences are created by sub-section 3. It is for the defendant to show that:
- his course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime;
- his course of conduct was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or
- the pursuit of his course of conduct was reasonable for the protection of himself or another or for the protection of his or another's property.
Defence to Breach of Criminal or Civil Order
The sole defence to a breach of a criminal or a civil order is that the defendant had a reasonable excuse. All of the defences are for the defendant to show, and therefore it follows that the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities.
Examples of Use of Defences
The first defence (see Defence to Harassment, above in this section) to sections 2 and 4 most obviously applies to the police, and any other investigative agencies, such as the Post Office or Customs and Excise. It is possible that it could also be raised by individuals, such as investigative journalists or Neighbourhood Watch members, who claim that their activities are for the purpose of detecting or preventing crime.
The second defence (see Defences, above in this section) to sections 2 and 4 most obviously applies to companies acting within their legal entitlement, for example a Building Society manager warning in writing of repossession proceedings, because of default in mortgage payments, followed by repossession taking palace.
The third defence (see Defences, above in this section) to section 2 is that the defendant was acting reasonably in the particular circumstances. This is a wide defence, which covers the pursuit of a legitimate trade or profession. Ultimately, the decision as to what amounts to reasonable behaviour will rest with the courts.
Secretary of State's Certificate - section 12
Archbold: 19-277h
In order to protect the activities of the security forces, and those investigating serious crime, under s.12, the Secretary of State may issue a certificate to the effect that the behaviour complained of was done in relation to:
- national security
- the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or
- the prevention or detection of serious crime.
Such a certificate is conclusive evidence that the Act does not apply to the conduct of a person on a specified occasion. This will prevent surveillance targets from taking out private prosecutions in order to expose those keeping surveillance, should such prosecutions get as far as trial without being taken over and discontinued by the DPP. It is hard to envisage circumstances where a prosecution resulting from a police charge will result in the need for such a certificate.
As certificates are made by the Secretary of State, they can be expected to relate only to high level operations concerning terrorism or very serious crime. It is not thought likely that such certificates will be issued in relation to the activities of specialist police units.
Timing
The Act is not retrospective, so that charges must reflect a course of conduct which started on or after commencement, i.e. 16 June 1997. A course of conduct is defined as involving conduct on at least two occasions. The act does not specify what period of time should elapse between occasions. Arguably, therefore, so long as the behaviour complained of ceased, even for a short period of time, and then resumed either in the same or a different form, this can form a course of conduct.
Acts might be some distance apart, eg yearly on the victim's birthday, and yet still constitute a course of conduct. Each case will fall to be determined on its own facts.
As the s.2 offence is summary only, it is subject to the limitation of time imposed by s.127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. This requires informations or complaints to be heard within 6 months from the time when the offence was committed, or the mater of complaint arose. Arguably, as the offence under s.2 is a course of conduct, the offence is completed with the final act complained of, and the six months' limitation should run from this date. Prosecutors should be ready to argue this point, as it is anticipated that some magistrates may prefer a stricter interpretation, that all of the acts complained of should be within 6 months of charge.
Section 1(1A) was inserted by section 125(2) Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, and came into force on 1 July 2005.
Charging Practice
Specimen Standard Offence Wordings
Refer to Case Management System Indictment Builder
To show a course of conduct, conduct must be proved on at least two occasions. Prosecutors should seek to ensure that charges reflect the range and scale of the defendant's behaviour, and that there is sufficient evident to prove each incident alleged, in accordance with the Code.
It may be appropriate to charge other offences in conjunction with an offence under his Act, in the way that an assault charge might be charged in addition to an affray. Where other chares are brought, prosecutors should be prepared to justify this, and to resist any defence applications that the prosecution should proceed either under this Act, or under other legislation, but not under both.
Discretion
The Act is widely drafted, and could incorporate many minor forms of behaviour. The Home Office circular (refer to Home Office Circular 34 of 1997 below in this section) makes it clears at paragraph 6 that the Act is not intended to supplant existing powers to deal with incidents that do not reach the threshold of harassment. Care will have to be taken with the exercise both of the police discretion to charge, and of the prosecution's discretion to prosecute under the Code.
Acceptability of Pleas
Care should be taken in accepting pleas, to ensure that the protection given under the Act from a restriction order is not lost.
If an early incident is charged under other legislation (eg breach of the peace/s.5 Public Order Act 1986), and a subsequent incident establishes a course of conduct, it may be advisable to withdraw the earlier charge and to substitute a charge under this Act, covering both incidents. Difficulties will arise if an earlier incident has resulted in a conviction. It is unlikely that the courts will allow incidents that have already been dealt with to form part of a subsequent offence, given the doctrine of autre fois acquit and convict.
Similarly, where a defendant has been cautioned, care should be taken before going behind the caution and charging that incident as part of a course of conduct, as this may constitute an abuse of process.
Procedure - Pre-Trial
Victims should be advised by the police to diarise events, retain physical evidence such as letters, etc., and to take photographs of any visible evidence. These can then be exhibited, subject to admissibility. Victims should also be advised to keep copies of any injunctions or restraining orders, and to produce their copy to the police if the order is breached.
If an officer attends an incident, warns an offender of the effect of his actions and keeps a note of this warning, this will be of assistance in showing that the defendant knew or ought to have known the effect his behaviour was having on the victim, should his behaviour continue.
It is possible for behaviour directed at one person to harass another, so long as it can be proved that the defendant knew or ought to have known that his behaviour was causing harassment to that other. A stalker may seek to harass a victim through their friends or family.
Procedure - Post-Trial
Restraining Orders
Archbold: 19-277f
Under s.5, both the Magistrates' and the Crown Court can make a restraining order on conviction, in order to protect the victim, or any other person mentioned in the order from further conduct which amounts either to harassment or causing feast of violence.
This is one of the major benefits of the Act, which is discussed at some length in the Home Office circular at paragraph 19. The following points are made in that paragraph:
- although the court may make an order of its own volition, it is expected that the prosecution will ask for an order, and that the contents of the order would be discussed in any PSR's;
- the contents of the order are at the court's discretion, provided that the court is satisfied that the conditions are necessary to protect the victim or other person named in the order;
- the order gives protection to the victim, and is not a punishment. The duration of the order should reflect the need for future protection and not the seriousness of the previous conduct;
- indefinite orders may be appropriate in many cases, with discharge or variation being considered in due course;
- applications to vary should not be granted without good cause, and courts should ensure that all interested parties have been able to make representations;
- it would be helpful if courts and prosecutors arranged local procedures to ensure that there are prompts to bring the court's attention to their power to make a restraining order, and that if the court decides not to make an order, the reasons for that decision are given in open court;
- CJS agencies must work together to exchange information about restraining orders. Orders must be copied to the police, to victims, and to the Prison Service where appropriate, and release dates should be notified to the prosecution and the victim;
- Orders should contain a written statement of the consequences of breach.
Variation/Discharge of Restraining Orders
Under s5(4), the prosecutor, the defendant, or any other party mentioned in the order may apply for variation or discharge of Restraining Orders. Variation is not defined, but paragraph 18 of the Home Office circular makes it clear that variation can include extending the duration of the order.
Prosecutors clearly have a post conviction role in assisting victims where variation is sought. It will therefore be necessary to retain papers where restraining orders are made, until the order ends or is discharged. Local liaison will be needed with the police to ensure that systems are in place to arrange for variation applications to be made.
Where the police make recommendations as to the need for, and terms of a restraining order, these will be made on form MG(c). Prosecutors may wish to discuss the terms of orders in advance with the defence, so that arrangement can be reached wherever possible. Indefinite orders will ensure that victims are adequately protected for the foreseeable future. Some courts may be reluctant to make indefinite orders. In such cases, the prosecution should consider making an application for variation, towards the end of an order, to extend it. Case papers should be retained until the expiry of the order.
Where courts express a reluctance to make an order, prosecutors should point out that orders can be varied or discharged upon application, but can only be made upon conviction. If an order is not made, the court should be asked to state their reasons, in accordance with paragraph 19(v) of the Home Office circular.
Terms of the Order
It is important that the terms of orders are clear, but not so prescriptive was to allow alternative forms of harassment. Geographical limitations, such as staying 300 yards away from the victim should be suggested with care. Difficulties could arise in proving distances should there be a breach, and harassment may be possible from 301 yards. Terms of the order can arguably reflect pre-commencement behaviour, as they are not a punishment, but a protection against future offending.
It should be noted that restraining orders should be considered where the defendant receives a custodial penalty, as it is possible to harass or cause fear of violence from prison through the use of telephones, letters or third parties. The prison can be informed of the existence of an order by the police, using form POL 1.
A defendant may seek to make repeated applications for variation, to harass the victim. In such cases, the prosecutor should remind the court of its powers to control abuse of its process. Victims should be informed of applications to vary, and asked to express their views and to attend if necessary.
Relationship between Civil and Criminal Provisions
Archbold 2002:19-277d
S.3 provides victims with civil redress in the county court. A victim can obtain an injunction where harassment is apprehended.
If a victim initiates proceedings in the civil court, and criminal proceedings result from the same course of conduct alleged, then it is usual for criminal proceedings to take priority.
Under s3(6) breaches will be dealt with in the criminal courts unless the breach is not reported to the police, or the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the criminal burden of proof.
Rules of court, and forms, will be issued to govern procedures under s.3 and s.5. Further guidance will be issued once these are agreed. In the interim, prosecutors are advised to refer courts to the contents of the Home Office circular for guidance, particularly in relation to restraining orders (to be confirmed).
Annex A
Home Office Circular 34/1997 Protection from Harassment Act 1997
HOME OFFICE
Sentencing and Offences Unit
50 Queen Anne's Gate,
London,
SW1H 9AT
Addressed to: Lord Chief Justice, Crown Court Judges, Court of Appeal Judges, Circuit Administrators, Stipendiary Magistrates, The Chief Clerks to the Judges, The Chief Crown Prosecutors, The Chief Officers of Police (England and Wales), The Chief Constable (Scotland), The Chief Constable (Royal Ulster Constabulary), Association of Chief Officers of Probation, Clerks to the Justices Magistrates Court (Chairman of the Bench), The Magistrates' Association, The Association of Magisterial Officers, Magistrates' Court Division, Lord Chancellor's Department, Directors of Social Services, Judicial Studies Board
Date: 16 June 1997
Dear Sir/Madam
Home Office Circular 34/1997: Protection From Harassment Act 1997
Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 to 12 of this Act will be brought into force on 16 June 1997 by virtue of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (Commencement) (No.l) Order 1997. Sections 8-11 are applicable to Scotland and are not discussed in this Circular. Sections 3(1), 3(2) and 6 of this Act will be brought into force on 16 June 1997 by the Lord Chancellor by virtue of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 Commencement) (No.2) Order 1997 (see paragraphs 11-15 below for a brief description). The purpose of this Circular is to provide guidance to those working in the criminal justice system on the provisions being brought into force by the No-1 order. This Circular is for guidance only and should not be regarded as providing legal advice. Legal advice should be sought if there is any doubt as to the application or interpretation of the legislation.
1. Section 1 of the Act prohibits a person from pursuing a course of conduct which amounts to harassment. In order to commit an offence under section 2 of the Act, it is necessary to show that:
i. harassment was caused. Harassment is not defined in the Act, except that it includes causing the person alarm or distress. Harassment is, however, a concept which the courts are used to interpreting through other legislation (e.g. the Public Order Act 1986);
ii. the harassment was caused by a course of conduct. This is defined in the Act as conduct on more than one occasion; though there is no requirement that the conduct is the same on each occasion. The Act is not retrospective, and all incidents which form a course of conduct will have to post date implementation. Conduct can include speech and;
iii. the alleged offender knows, or ought to know, that the course of conduct amounts to harassment of the other.
2. A course of conduct which causes harassment is not prohibited if the person who pursued it shows:
i. that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. This defence is most obviously available to the police, or other statutory investigating agencies;
ii. that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law, or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment; or
iii. that in the particular circumstances it was reasonable. Many, otherwise legitimate, activities may cause a person to feel harassed, but should not be prohibited by the provisions of this Act. For example investigative journalists, private investigators or debt collectors are legitimate professionals who should be free to carry out their activities. But they do not have total immunity under the provisions of this Act. They would need to show that their actions were - in all the circumstances - reasonable. Non trade activities would also gain protection from this defence.
3. Section 2 of the Act makes it an offence for a person to pursue a course of conduct in breach of section 1. A person found guilty of this offence is liable on summary conviction to a maximum of six months' imprisonment, or a level 5 fine, or to both. The offence is not triable on indictment.
4. The offence of causing harassment is arrestable under the provisions of section 24(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and attracts the powers associated with such offences.
5. Although the offence of harassment in the Act is widely drawn, it does not supplant existing powers to deal with specific situations like neighbour disputes, which do not of themselves reach the threshold of harassment. However, where harassment is caused in these situations, and the elements at paragraph 2 ii and iii are present, then the offence could apply.
6. Section 4 creates a new criminal offence of causing fear of violence. This offence will be committed only if the following elements are present:
i. fear of violence was caused (on at least two occasions);
ii. the fear of violence was caused by a course of conduct; and
iii. the alleged offender knows, or ought to know, that the course of conduct will cause the other to fear violence.
7. The defences to this offence are similar to those for the offence of causing harassment except that there is no defence of acting reasonably - it can never be reasonable to cause someone to fear violence other than in regard to the narrower defence of acting reasonably for the protection of himself or another, or for the protection of his or another's property.
8. This offence is arrestable under the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act by virtue of its maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.
9. For both offences an alleged offender "ought to know" that t his or her conduct would cause harassment, or fear of violence, if a reasonable person, in possession of the same information, would think that the course of conduct would have that effect. Therefore, it would not be open for a defendant to argue that he or she did not intend to cause the victim harassment, or to fear violence, if a reasonable person, on the same facts, would realise that harassment or fear of violence would be the likely result of that course of conduct.
10. Sections 3 and 6 of the Act apply to the civil tort of harassment. Sections 3(1) and 3(2) and 6 will be brought into force on 16 June. Sections 3(3) - 3(9) will be brought into force following consultation on development of rules of court.
11. Section 3 enables a person who is, or may become, the victim of behaviour prohibited by section 1 to take civil proceedings against the perpetrator. The purpose of the section is to provide an alternative means of. protection, by way of civil injunction, and the right to compensation, in cases where the criminal sanction is inappropriate or not available. For example, this may be because the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the criminal standard of proof that an offence has been committed, or because the evidence indicates that an offence will be committed if the defendant is not restrained by an injunction.
12. Sections 3(1) and 3(2) provide for the civil proceedings to betaken. Sections 3(3) - 3(9) cover procedures for an arrest warrant and criminal breach of the civil injunction. Because these procedures and the interaction between criminal and civil processes is novel, rules of court and appropriate forms will be needed. Therefore, these sections of the Act will be brought into force after there has been the appropriate consultation and agreement on the rules required.
13. Until sections 3(3) to 3(9) are brought into force, breach of the civil injunction will be a contempt of court only and punishable as such.
14. Section 6 amends the Limitation Act 1980 so that the special time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries (3 years) does not apply to any action brought for damages under section 3 of the Act. The limit will, therefore, be 6 years
15. Under the provisions of section 5 of the Act a court sentencing or otherwise dealing with a person convicted of an offence under sections 2 or 4 of this Act, may, as well as passing any other sentence, make a restraining order. Such an order may, for the purpose of protecting the victim of the offence, or any other person named in the order, prohibit the defendant from doing anything described in the order which:
a. amounts to harassment, or
b. will cause fear of violence.
16. The order may have effect for a specified period, or until further order.
17. The prosecution, defendant, or anyone named in the order may apply to the court which made the order for it to be varied or discharged. Variation can include extending the duration of the order.
18. Consideration is being given to the formulation of rules of court to cover the making and variation of restraining orders. Until rules are available however, courts may wish to consider the following points:
i. courts may make a restraining order at sentence of their own volition; though normally it is expected that the prosecution would ask for such an order to be made and that the appropriate contents of the order would be considered in reports for sentence if any;
ii. the contents of the order are at the discretion of the court provided that the court is satisfied that the conditions are necessary to protect the victim or any other person named in the order from harassment or fear of violence;
iii. the order is not a punishment; it is protection for the victim or any other person named in the order. The duration of the order should not therefore depend on the seriousness of the conduct which led to the conviction, but on the perceived need to protect the victim from future acts by the defendant. In many cases the court might reasonably conclude that it cannot make a fixed duration order at the time of sentence. Indefinite orders ("until further order") may be the appropriate solution in many cases, so that the question of the discharge of the order can be considered at a variation hearing in due course, in the light of evidence of the behaviour, since sentence, of the defendant;
iv. courts will also want to consider carefully applications for the variation or discharge of orders. Courts should not be prepared to grant such applications without good cause. Where they are minded to grant an application courts will want to ensure that all interested parties have been able to make representations;
v. the restraining order is one of the most important new features introduced by the Act. Given that the nature of harassment involves an offender with- a strong motivation to continue causing distress to the victim, it is expected that the restraining orders will be appropriate in the majority of cases. It will be helpful if courts and prosecutors arrange that their local procedures include a prompt to ensure that the courts' attention is drawn to the powers to make such an order in every case of harassment, and that if the court decides not to make an order, the reasons for that decision are given in open court.
19. The disclosure and exchange of information, between agencies in the criminal justice system, is essential if restraining orders are to be fully effective. Copies of restraining orders, and any subsequent variations, should be provided to the police, as well as victims. The Phoenix criminal record database on the Police National Computer is being developed to enable the recording and retrieval of details of restraining orders and civil injunctions made under the Act. The Prison Service will also need full details of a restraining order, if a defendant is also sentenced to a term of imprisonment, so that they can prevent the defendant from contacting the victim(s) from prison. Similarly the prosecution and the victim will need to know the release date of the defendant from prison so that an application can be made for a variation in the terms of the restraining order (if appropriate). It is hoped that all agencies will co-operate as far as practicable to ensure that relevant information is made available in good time.
20. A 'breach of a restraining order is itself a criminal offence with a maximum penalty (on indictment) of five years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. A single breach of the order is sufficient for an offence to be committed. In view of the liability for criminal penalties for a breach of the order, courts may wish to ensure that a defendant, who is the subject of such an order, receives a written statement of the consequences of breaching the terms of the order.
21. Section 7 interprets the terms used in sections 1 to 5 of the Act. Section 12 of the Act provides that the Secretary of State may issue a certificate that anything done by a specified person on a specified occasion related to:
a. national security;
b. the economic well being of the United Kingdom; or
c. the prevention or detection of serious crime;
and was done on behalf of the Crown. The Act does not bind the Crown and such a certificate will confirm that the conduct in question does not fall within the scope of the Act.
22. People suffering from a mental disorder are not exempt from the provisions of this Act and their conduct should be considered in the light of the reasonable person test in the same way as for any other person. Nonetheless, attention is drawn to the provisions of Home Office Circulars 66/1990 and 12/1995 which gave advice on appropriate action to be taken with regard to mentally disordered people who come in contact with the criminal justice system, and the amendment to the circulars issued on 9 April 1996 in the light of the case of R v. Chippenham Magistrates' Court ex parte Thompson.
